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Generalized Quality
Abstracting a Model of General Globalizations of a Body 
of Knowledge--Quality--from History of the Total Quality 
Movement and Applying It to Non-Quality Bodies of Knowledge 




1.  How did the total quality management movement treat the body of knowledge 
named “quality” so that it achieved more quality outcomes than prior professional 
treatment of the same body of knowledge?
2.  Can the same abstract operators that TQM applied to quality knowledge be 
applied to other bodies of knowledge with similar great results?
We have in recent history a body of knowledge--quality--handled by a very unusual, 
in history, set of what is called here “globalizations” of that body of knowledge, 
with the result immense improvements in quality all over the industrial world by 
dozens of nations and millions of fi rms.   These globalizations may represent a new 
way of handling bodies of knowledge that replace our older “professional” ways 
of handling them.  This paper uses extremely abstract frameworks to identify all 
operations on quality knowledge involved in the history of the global total quality 
movement, categorized by each of many “globalizations”.   It then examines in what 
if scenarios the application of these operations to other bodies of knowledge, to see 
what improvements in application of them might be practically realized.   The paper 
also serves as a very abstract overall history of total quality thought, gurus, and 
methods.
METHOD: 
1.  Search hundreds of books for statements on sources of complexity and categorize 
them into a model of a few dozen categories; search hundreds of books for 
statements on how the total quality movement treated the body of knowledge 
named “quality” and categorize them into a model of 36 “globalizations”.
2.  Sources of complexity and traditional ways of handling it are summarized to 
defi ne very abstractly the overall goal of handling knowledge as done in the total 
quality movement.  
3.  The history of treatment of quality knowledge by the total quality movement is 
surveyed and summarized as 36 “globalizations”.
4.  In the process of doing 1,2, and 3 immediately above, a model of 256 systems 
effects, from over 24 academic fi elds of research is presented, summarizing 
hundreds of books on topics touching on system effects and general non-linearities 
in systems. 
This paper presents a model of sources of complexity and traditional ways of 
handling it.  It then presents one particularly powerful way of handling all 
forms of complexity in that model, namely, globalizations of a particular body of 
knowledge found in the total quality movement.  It presents a generalization of this 
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way of handling complexity by globalizing bodies of knowledge and examines the 
possibility of applying this generalized model to bodies of knowledge other than 
quality knowledge.  The purpose of this paper is to establish a correct historical 
model of how quality was globalized in various ways, abstract away quality-related 
contents from that model, to get generalized operators, that might be apply-able 
to other bodies of knowledge, besides quality knowledge, to extend their capability 
of handling the forms of complexity summarized in the model that starts off this 
paper.  Which source and way of handling complexity each globalization applies to 
is indicated in a fi nal model at the conclusion of the paper.  
Passive sources of complexity that work by shrinking scope of actions and actors 
in the face of situational complexity and active sources of complexity that work by 
making situations generate surprising effects, both categorized by mental and social 
contents, are presented, along with traditional means of handling them, either by 
scaling up the scope of human actors and actions or by scaling down the amount 
of situation faced.   A 30 year sequence of globalizations of one body of knowledge, 
quality knowledge, that vastly extended the amount and types of complexity that 
quality efforts in businesses could handle well is then examined, in order to abstract 
from it generalized globalization operations that might be applied to other bodies 
of knowledge, besides quality, in order to enable them to similarly handle well large 
amounts and varieties of complexity.   The result of this paper is this generalized 
model of a sequence of globalizations that can be applied to many bodies of 
knowledge to make them capable of handling better the forms of complexity in this 
paper’s model.  
Along the way this paper presents the most comprehensive models yet published of 
types of non-linear system effects in society, diverse forms of social diversity, and 
various emergent new forms of computational system.
RESULT: 36 globalizations that can be applied to any body of knowledge and several 
dozen sources of complexity with a mapping showing which globalizatons reduce 
which sources of complexity.   This model is a hypothesis, derived from categorizing 
thousands of statements about how quality knowledge was handled in the total 
quality movement.
Key Words : Total Quality, TQM, Quality Totalizations, Quality Globalizations, System 
Effects, Non-linearities, Non-linear Systems, Complexity
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again.   Its past arrogance guarantees signifi cant 
long-term loss of respect now that scientifi c proof 
of the invalidity of its logical foundations has been 
awarded the Nobel Prize.  “Behavioral” economics 
is the name now given to the remnants of the 
economics profession trying to rebuild economics 
on assumptions not optimized merely to make maths 
simple enough to publish in journals.  
So there are four sources of interest in the twin 
of non-linearity of systems with human social psych: 
the practical power of fi nding tipping points, the 
expansion of human goals immediately wiping out 
any simplifi cations obtained by new knowledge, the 
demise of last bastions of “grand theory solutions” 
as economics has had its logical legs knocked out 
from under it by Nobel prize winning research, and 
proof that the social psyches of people in different 
cultures are not the same and, more than that, are not 
even non-malleable.  There is good reason to believe 
that complexity from the non-linearity of systems 
and from the culture-specifi c, malleable limits to 
perception and thought found in social psychology, 
will be with us for eons.  
The global economic disaster of 2008, 2009 
ushered in by the “best” colleges of the world in the 
form of an MBA sub-culture (“sub” in every sense 
of that word) that wiped out the global fi nancial 
system and repute of laisez faire capitalism, is a clear 
demonstration that complexity becomes a hiding 
place for evil men and their greeds.   It is a PR tool 
for hiding private profl igate interests who steal from 
public supports and sources.   Entire civilizations may 
die, manifest their self-limiting nature, by becoming 
too complex for any policy to make an impact. 
They may simply absorb all interventions without 
changing much.   Both of these ideas--MBAs driving 
the world into disaster and Western civilization self 
destructing--illustrate the practical import of what 
this paper discusses--sources of complexity and a 
possible way to handle them by globalizing bodies of 
knowledge in 36 ways presented below.   
Research into the Origins of Complexity 
Revealing Its Destiny
Bak’s Nobel work on self-organized criticality 
in systems (Bak, 1996), Mandelbrot’s work on the 
fractality of patterns in nature (Mandelbrot, 1977), 
Kaufmann’s work on self-organized criticality in 
gene systems (Kauffman, 2000), Wolfram’s work 
on simple program models of time, space, and 
everything else (Wolfram, 2002), Brian Author’s 
Two of Social Complexity’s Sources:  Social 
Psych Meets Non-Linear System Dynamics
At the beginning of this century a book of 
popular exposition of science appeared, to wide 
acclaim, Gladwell’s Tipping Point (Gladwell, 2000). 
It presents social psych research in marketing, 
infl uence, media impact, and design, showing how 
the type of being it describes humans to be, handles 
a basically non-linear world full of non-tipping 
points--nearly all inputs have minimal or entirely 
predictable effects--and some rare tipping points--a 
few inputs, not at all different from thousands of 
others, have immense unpredictable effects.   It is 
this combination, recent social psych images of 
what humans are like with recent complexity theory 
research on how nearly all systems in our world 
are non-linear, that made the book sell so well, it 
seems.  Complexity from limitations of the human 
mind and complexity from non-linearity of reality 
get combined.  This combination interests a lot of 
people, it appears.   
It has to be admitted that there are a lot of 
glib references to complexity with every era, from 
thousands of year B.C. to now, claiming how they, 
uniquely, among all eras, face exponential increases 
in rate of change and complexity of system.   Actual 
research, however, fi nds little evidence in support 
of these claims (Plotkin, 1993).  Nor has our greater 
knowledge of non-linearity in the world’s systems 
and the particularities of human social psychology 
done much to change the overall amount of speed 
of change or complexity (Johnson, 1995).   Each 
new frontier understood via knowledge that humans 
developed, simply exposed further frontiers as human 
goals expanded to go beyond present achievements 
and limits (Bailey, 1996).   
Economics, queen of the socia l sciences 
using government-paid-for databases that allowed 
physics - l ike equat ions as models (i f  tota l ly 
unrealistic assumptions about human nature were 
accepted) recently has been defeated by twin attacks, 
proving that the assumptions about maximizing 
utility that make its math simple (the recent Nobel 
Prize awarded for Kahnemann and Tversky’s work on 
prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky, 2000), 
do not in reality obtain and a further attack (at the 
moment mostly by Nisbett, 2003) showing that those 
departures from rational utility behavior are not the 
same across cultures or across time within any one 
culture.   Economics may lumber on, proud of its 
equations, but it will have a hard time being queen 
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work on the economics of fi rst mover advantage 
(Arthur, 1994), niches from product niches, and 
take-off phenomena in markets, among many others, 
have been lumped together and called “complexity 
theory”, by popular science writers like Waldrop 
and Goodwin (Goodwin, 1994), and others, often 
bringing in the work of the Santa Fe Institute, a 
post-graduate school dedicated to fi nding the origins 
and destiny of increasing system complexity in the 
universe.   Wolfram suggests (Wolfram, 2002) that 
his principle of General Computational Equivalence, 
means that as many as, perhaps, 30 of his 255 
elementary one-dimensional cellular automata are 
universal computation devices capable of emulating 
any computation by any brain or machine computer, 
hence, much of nature is based on them, producing 
the patterns they produce, including human brains. 
Hence, our brains are not more computationally 
sophisticated than many systems in nature, assuring 
us that we will perpetually fi nd systems we are 
unable to build predictive models of.   
The origins of complexity, then, may indicate 
that further knowledge development does not answer 
questions so much as fi nd exactly which questions 
we will perpetually be unable to answer, regardless 
of how we bio-engineer bigger or better brains in the 
future.   A lot of early 21st century science writing 
has borrowed from the above research two terms, 
“emergence” and “self organizing” and entirely 
without discipline, sprinkled them everywhere in 
articles of dubious organization and intent.   I have 
no desire to get sucked into a similar display of lack 
of mental discipline in this paper (especially since 
my library--I being tricked by editors--contains not a 
few such tomes).  
The Purpose of This Research
This paper bui lds a model of sources of 
complexity and traditional ways of handling it.  It 
then examines the history of one elaborate way of 
handling all the sorts of complexity in that model that 
worked well--successive globalizations of one body 
of knowledge--to see if a generalized form of them 
can be developed in this paper that could be usefully 
applied to other bodies of knowledge to enable them 
to handle well the same sorts of complexity.  That 
model that worked well was successive globalizations 
of quality knowledge, starting with “total”izing 
quality, as found in a 30 year history of the “total” 
quality movement.  Could abstract versions of those 
globalizations of quality knowledge, abstracting out 
anything quality-specifi c, be applied to other bodies 
of knowledge, enabling them to handle the same 
sources of complexity well?   That is the research 
question that this paper explores.  The product this 
paper produces is the abstracted model of successive 
globalizations of a body of knowledge that could be 
thusly applied to other bodies of knowledge.  
Passive (Personal) Sources of 
Complexity--Reducing Self Scope in the face 
of Expanding Situation Scope
One of the major types of source of complexity 
has always been the way humanity as a whole 
splits into parts, professions, classes, cultures and 
the like.   By making each human more partial, 
less representative of the whole of humanity, 
over eons, “progress” in history keeps forcing 
complexity-handling crises onto civilization.   The 
list below is suggestive without being complete.  
Special izat ion--Complexi ty  from People ,  
Knowledge, and Tools Narrower than Problems 
and Opportunities Are
(Giddens, 1991; Giddens and Turner, 1987; Hechter 
& Horne, 2003)
Herber t Simon emphasized how each new 
knowledge “niche” produces more new knowledge 
niche possibilities than earlier ones, so possible new 
knowledge expands more and more rapidly as total 
knowledge known increases (Simon, 1967).   Anyone 
going to an academic conference the past 30 years 
has experienced this.   The fi rst conferences in 
artifi cial intelligence that I attended 30 years ago, 
were populated by people who delved into, read in, 
presented in all parts of the fi eld.   Current such 
conferences are subdivided into dozens of narrow 
subfi elds and no one knows many of them.   Few are 
conversant with more than a few such subfi elds.   The 
number of people able to competently present in, say, 
10% of these subfi elds is vanishingly small.   The 
knowledge of professional people, of all sorts, is 
an ever smaller fraction of their own overall fi elds. 
People in the same fi eld, more and more, cannot 
communicate with and understand each other.   
This is itself enough to increase complexity--if 
we learn a lot every day as individuals, our personal 
rate of learning is still slow enough that we known 
every day a smaller and smaller fraction of what is 
important out there to learn.    There is another source 
of complexity in this phenomenon, however.   There 
are no subfi elds dedicated to combining, ranking, 
fusing, splitting, manipulating other subfi elds.   To 
be sure some combining, ranking, fusing, and the 
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the modern world, leading to short circuited thinking. 
We respond to situations with technical solutions. 
New software tools that help programmers handle 
problems caused by the complexity of software tools 
they face and use daily, is but one humorous example 
of how we deepen our problems by choosing as tools 
for handling the same tools causing those problems. 
The problem is software-tool caused complexity 
and the proposed solution is another software tool. 
This drive to let favored tools respond instead of 
entire people insures that more and more such tools 
get applied more and more ineffectively, driving us 
to invent and deploy more such ineffective tools. 
US government foreign policy early in the 21st 
century seems to be driven by having the world’s 
biggest military tool and hence, a lot of “interest 
group” interest in fi nding uses of that tool.   If a tool 
exists, especially one associated with lots of money, 
there will be a drive to use it.   Of course, military 
solutions tend to create problems also needing 
military solutions till everyone is in permanent war 
with everyone else.   
Sequestration--Complexity from Social Hiding 
Away of Problematic Types of People and 
Situations
(Giddens, 1991; Bohman, 1991; Fiske and Shweder, 
1986; Eisenstadt, 1986)
Sociologists have not iced how cr iminals, 
mentally ill people, children, the elderly, and other 
“problematic” types of people get put away in special 
institutions where they do not meet each other and 
do not interact much with “unproblematic” people. 
With every type of person in society who needs any 
specifi c type of care hidden away where most people 
do not encounter them in daily life, policy develops 
that ignores them and those unproblematic remaining 
people not hidden away develop an image of “life 
not needing care” that accelerates their personal 
transition into problematic types that need such 
care.   The irony of this is not lost on sociologists. 
Complexity increases when complexity of care 
actually there is hidden from view and later therefore 
from policy making.  
Commercialization of Art- - Complexity from 
Performance Stripped from Daily Lives and 
Concentrated in Central Commercial Elites 
(Segel, 1986; Green, 1986; Weber, 1986; Miller, 
2001)
One of the most st r ik ing components of 
any tr ibal, primitive, or ancient culture is the 
participation of every member of the community in 
some sort of annual festival, where they have one 
like goes on all the time, informally and sometimes 
formally, generating new subfi elds, but my point is 
there are no subfi elds dedicated to this.   As a result, 
problems more and more appear between fi elds, 
owned by no one.   Indeed, from policy perspectives 
our most intractable problems, all, appear from the 
gaps between fi elds and subfi elds,   
•  individual human rates of learning are smaller 
and smaller fractions of the overall growth rate 
of knowledge
•  what individuals know and aim to know is 
narrower and narrower exponentially increasing 
problems between fi elds having no owner.
Descartization---Complexity from People,  
Knowledge, and Tools Entirely Conceptual when 
Problems and Opportunities Are Emotive
(Miller, 2001; Green, 1986; Weber, 1986; Tarnas, 
1991)
Le Car re, the famous spy novel ist of the 
previous century, somewhat jokingly compared US 
and British foreign policy responses to crises--the 
US sent dozens of operatives with helicopters and 
equipment, the British, he said, sent “one good 
man”.   This rather romantically captures my point 
here--that individual people and organizations more 
and more respond to situations cognitively depending 
on rational ideas to solve things, not depending on 
full people to solve them.   This is so much the case 
that any attempt to exercise one’s full humanity in 
any meaningful social role is likely to be a fi reable 
offense.   Full people are “unprofessional” in modern 
work roles and negatively sanctioned.  
This creates complexity by reducing the 
dimensions of being human allowed into open 
exercise in social roles.   If you have to solve 
everything with only one part of humanity, you 
have one hand tied behind your back, so to speak. 
Descartes said “I think therefore I am”, Plato said 
eternal ideas and forms are discovered by humanity, 
Hegel saw “spirit” unfolding itself in history--in 
myriad ways the West has fl ed body and into mind 
till today breasts are more dangerous on television 
than serial killings and mass slaughter.   Emotion and 
body, omitted, denied, fl ed, feared, avoided, do not 
go away--they stay around causing things that we try 
to solve by ignoring them, using only cognitive idea 
tools and approaches.   
Technicization--Complexity from Tools Being 
Relied on More Than the People Who Use Them 
(Ellul, 1990; Burris, 1993; Fogg, 2003) 
A fascination with technologies and tools infests 
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or more performance roles, showing what they can 
be and do before others in their community.   What 
make this striking is the complete absence of such 
roles in modern community.   There performance has 
been commercialized, centralized, made elite so that 
a few super-rich people in major city centers “broad”
cast their personal performances to millions of 
sitting people, whose daily lives are stripped of any 
performance.  
The repetitious daily stuff called, euphemistically 
“news”, is fi lled with kids, performing for weeks 
or months or years in video game worlds, then 
taking those behaviors one day into a high school, 
leaving people dead.   Lives utterly stripped of 
chances to perform before younger and older entire 
communities of people will fi nd last ditch suicidal 
ways and places to perform.   Unexpectedness, hence 
complexity, increases when emotions and needs erupt 
unpredictably and in non-constructive intensities.    
S e l f  B u i l t  I d e n t i t y  ( s e l f  r e f l e c t i o n  
work load) - - Complex ity from Inadequate 
Inherited Roles and Feelings so Identities Must 
Continually Be Self Built 
(Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; Eikleberry, 1999; 
Young and Collin, 1992; Suleiman, 1996; Warr, 
2002; Hirschhorn, 1988; Giddens, 1991)
We used to inherit roles, social class, destiny, and 
lots of other things from our parents and communities 
of birth.   There used to be both few options and little 
demand for options.   Modernity with its transport, 
broadcasts, invasion of local communities by global 
products, and concentration of people in cities, invents 
roles, needs, capabilities not there before.   These 
attract people out of inherited roles, classes, and 
destinies.   The result, however, is lots of options, like 
East Germans freed one year to enter West German 
grocery stores.   Each option invites a person to 
defi ne him or her self.  The result of that, however, is 
people face, daily, the need to be aware of and make 
their own identity.  
It is vastly more complex when you defi ne 
yourself in dozens of daily choices that no one 
ever faced before, than when you inherit roles 
from your parents and community and carry them 
out more or less as they did before you.    Without 
precedent, evaluating any one new role you or 
others play, is laborious, fraught with interpretive 
work and ambiguity.   The mental load alone can 
be overwhelming.   Russian immigrants moved to 
Long Island, New York complained of “tiredness” 
from going to grocery stores and facing dozens of 
competing brands for every product type, something 
they lacked in the Soviet Union.  
Value Relativism (Liberty without Freedom, 
authority)--Complexity from No Criteria Above 
All Viewpoints Ordering the Viewpoints 
(Smith and Bond, 1999; Berry et al, 1992; Nisbett, 
2003; Scollon, 1995; Shweder, 1991; Giddens, 1991; 
Cilliers, 1999; Roehner and Syme, 2002)
When college students go to college, the fi rst 
thing that overwhelms them is the volume of reading 
that is expected of them.  The second thing is the 
diversity of views and viewpoints there.   Everyone 
there is sure they are right yet nearly everyone there 
has opinions different from everyone else there.   The 
contradiction of everyone thinking they are right 
and everyone believing something different than 
everyone else is so powerful it destroys childish 
confi dence in unexamined personal inher ited 
views and viewpoints.   Most college sophomores, 
despairing of ever “being right”, fall into relativism 
“all opinions have some truth to them”.   Relativism 
is despair over human diversity.
When there is no one “r ightest” or “most 
authoritative” viewpoint to rank order and prioritize 
all other viewpoints, people despair into relativism. 
When all views and viewpoints are treated with 
equal respect even though some viewpoints lead 
to murder and others lead to civilizational decline, 
people despair.   When, in a nostalgia for authority, 
people resurrect some past book or belief and 
worship its as best even in the complete absence of 
any evidence supporting that belief, people despair 
into fundamentalism.   Relativism is despair, political 
correctness is a form of despair, and fundamentalism 
is a nostalgic form of despair.   People work hard 
to liberate themselves from rigid, out-dated belief 
systems, only to suffer greatly when no authorities 
are automatic and no beliefs have easy priority. 
The work of thinking one’s way through in a world 
without automatically authoritative viewpoints is 
great and a heavy burden.  Complexity increases 
when no overall viewpoint automatically organizes 
all other viewpoints and complexity increases 
more when people fl ee in despair from facing this 
and become politically correct or fundamentalist. 
Pretending that one view is rightest and pretending 
that all views are equal are both despairing fl ights 
from the workload of thinking things through in a 
world without easy automatic answers.   They are 
both simply forms of mental laziness, fl ights from 
complexity.  
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Demystifi cation- -Complexity from Seeing All 
Human Civilizational Contents as Disguises for 
Sneaky Power Plays- -“Chip on the Shoulder” 
Social Theory, Liberty without Freedom 
(Leitch, 1983; Edeline et al, 1970; Mueller-Vollmer, 
1985; Culler, 1982; Reiss, 1982; Lodge, 1979; Lodge, 
1981; Selden, 1989; Blonsky, 1985; Shapiro and Sica, 
1984; Lentricchia, 1980; Greimas, 1987; Iser, 1993)
As we grow up we learn things we are not aware 
we are learning.  This is called socialization and 
it is a normal part of all societies.   Children learn 
never to consider or imagine options never presented 
to them by the parents, era, community, schools, 
nationalities, genders they grow up in.   Later in 
life we discover that there were alternatives, lots of 
alternatives, never discussed or presented to us, and 
we feel cheated.   We were told the world is “this 
and that” and most of the interesting alternatives 
in life were not included in that description we 
unconsciously imbibed while growing up.   This is not 
a vague phenomena but it has terrifi c consequences. 
An eye doctor, when asked why our left eye clouded 
up in blindness last week, gives us medicine but 
talks about his summer vacation whenever we ask 
about why.   Sure enough our right eye clouds up this 
week and the physician has more money from us and 
insurance.   Bitterly we learn, at some cost to our 
eye’s health, that doctors are often more interested 
in their own money than in our health.   All that talk 
from our mother about the role of physicians being 
helping us with our health seems at such moments a 
momentous lie.  Some of the more sensitive people 
among us are so disappointed at discovering this that 
they develop a chip on their shoulder--all truths are 
big lies, to them.   This takes the form of intellectuals 
demystifying all forms of power.   Power everywhere 
it is exercised is evil, they say.   All power hides 
secret selfi sh evil intents, they say.  Rationality, 
sex, church, love, literature, celebration, wine, and 
more is a disguise for secret hidden evil purposes, 
they say.  All good and effective phenomena are 
disguises, they say.   Complexity increases when 
this attitude escapes from intellectuals frustrated by 
lives entirely spent in academia without practical 
impact and spreads among ordinary people.   For 
everything in civilization and personal life that gets 
built, established, renovated, and improved requires 
exercise of power.   To condemn power in toto, is to 
wish everyone into academia.   To suspect everyone 
exercising power is to cripple civilization itself. 
People confused about whether they should develop 
and exercise power act too little too late, letting small 
problems grow gigantic.   
Mass Technology Systems- -Complexity from 
Wider Exposure to Diversity from Mass Standard 
Uniform Systems 
(Toffl er, 1988; Giddens and Turner, 1987; Enteman, 
1993; Zeldin, 1994; Braudel, 1986; Ellul, 1990; 
Burris, 1993; Fogg, 2003)
Uniformity increases exposure to diversity. 
Modernizat ion brought ra i l roads, a i rplanes, 
internets, cellular technologies, mass produced 
products--all distributed world wide.   The result is 
invasion of village India by images, songs, foods, 
and technologies that also invade Moscow suburbs 
and New York neighborhoods.  Sociologists have 
also noticed, however, how, gradually, aspects or 
products of that village in India participate in this 
invasion, going to Moscow and New York.   In other 
words, mass industry, mass transport, and mass 
society bring all parts of the world into contact with 
each other, not theoretically, but practically.   The 
possibilities of life, the options people face, expand 
with new options added by each part of the world. 
Mass systems expand diversity and complexity. 
They expand choice and intensify relativity of values. 
Marketization of Value--Complexity from Value 
Depending on What Others Bid 
(Evolution of Human Relations from Sharing to 
Ranking to Reciprocating to Market Competition 
on Price)--(Zelinsky, 1998; Arthur and Rousseau, 
1996; Roehner and Syme, 2002; Rothschild, 2001; 
Applebaum, 1992; Giddens, 1991)
The word “sophisticated” in Japanese-English 
dictionaries tends to be defi ned as “sneaky”.  These 
dictionaries are using the meaning that the word had 
100 years ago, when mostly country populations 
viewed city people as sneaky, that is, sophisticated. 
The word’s meaning has changed and now refers 
appreciat ively to the fl uency in style,  taste,  
livelihood, and mental acuity that living amid the 
diversity of a modern cosmopolis engenders.   One 
reason that country people distrusted city people was 
things that had inherent value to country people were 
exchanged for a price by city people.   Sex, sacred to 
country people, was bought and sold by city people. 
Land that was sacred to country people, was bought 
and sold by city people.  Human relationships, sacred 
to country people, were made and broken as needed 
by city people.   The invasion of shared values by 
exchanged values horrifi ed country people and 
threatened their unthinking belief that their fathers’ 
beliefs were enough for all people over all time to 
live by.  Complexity increases when values that 
cannot be exchanged, in part by being relativized, 
become capable of being exchanged for other values. 
Options increase under this arrangement.  
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Under-development (set up infrastructures, near 
future, population of competitors)--Complexity 
from Unreliable Near Future 
(Harrison and Huntington, 2000; Arthur, 1994; 
Citrin and Smith, 2003)
Economic development does at fi rst tend to 
decrease certain forms of complexity.   Researchers 
have found that establishing a reliable near future is 
one of the primary requirements of any economy that 
wants to grow and modernize.   When laws change 
at whim, or crime abounds, people cannot invest. 
The future lacks enough predictability of outcome. 
When no one invests, not surprisingly, economic 
take-off does not occur.   Individual people need to 
be reliable in certain ways, laws and institutions need 
to be reliable in certain ways, the near future needs 
to be dependable.   Thus economic take off requires 
lack of certain types of complexity.   
However, when economies have enough reliability 
of their near futures to take-off, complexity of other 
sorts rapidly increases.   Each product and service, 
generated, combines with some of all previous ones, 
to form new ones, leading to exponential increase 
in the actual possible one step of invention removed 
from current arrangements.  This is the familiar 
niches from niches aspect to non-linear growth 
phenomena in general, dealt with in the major section 
below this.  
Futurization--Complexity from Living in Visions, 
Not Seeing and Dealing with Present Actuals
(Giddens, 1991; Miller, 2001; Munck, 2000; Israel, 
2001; Braudel, 1986; Weber, 1976)
As identity becomes more self designed, built 
from daily new options and choices made, people 
tend more and more to live in their imagination rather 
than in their present actual.   They live in what is 
coming, from others and from themselves.  They can 
live in the the future so much and so habitually and 
so well that they lose sight of the present, tolerating 
awful conditions because the present is not the 
main show in their lives.  Subcultures of particular 
national cultures, including corporate cultures, as 
well as entire national cultures, live this way.  Living 
in the future to the extent that it occludes viewing the 
present, increases complexity because real causes 
and needs appear only in the real present.   When 
real causes and conditions are missed, they operate 
without observation and infl uence.   
Ideological Sel fishness - - Complexity from 
Semi-Magical Dependency on Invisible Hands 
Theories that Make Selfi shness Automatically 
Good or Alright (wealth as a measure of worth)--
(Johnson ,  1995;  Bai ley ,  1996;  Agazz i  and  
Montecucco, 2002; Strogatz, 2003; Axelrod and 
Cohen, 1999; Holland, 1998; Cowan et al, 1994; 
Schelling, 1978; Strevens, 2003; Weber, 1976; 
Cilliers, 1999)
Attending most classes of most top graduate 
schools of business exposes an ideology embedded 
in both those institutions and the MBAs newly 
m inted yea rly  t here.    I t  i s  a n ideology of  
abstraction- -viewing investments and revenue 
streams from those investments.   It is a mirror of 
economic theory based on optimizing economic 
value.    When East Asian nations buy ever more 
risky US government bonds to keep their currency 
values low so they can export more to the US than the 
US exports to them--they are pursuing not optimal 
economic value from their investments but optimal 
social value of fully employing their populations. 
Economists, decade after decade, viewing this, 
insist it is not sustainable, their theory tells them. 
However, their theory sees actors maximizing 
economic not social values, so their conclusions are 
irrational.   A few more decades of “unsustainable” 
US trade defi cits and “unsustainable” Japanese and 
Chinese trade surpluses should suffi ce to bring 
this home even to ideologically rigid economists 
and business school professors.   The same rigidity 
of thought that undermines theory in economists 
undermines performance of businesses managed 
by MBAs.   Again and again economic optima get 
achieved at unmeasured cost in social suboptima.   
Indeed, economics was the fi rst social science to 
mis-use and mis-generalize the idea of “emergence”. 
Ad a m Sm it h’s  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  s e l f i sh n e s s  
automatically produces growth, and wealth, via 
“invisible hands”, gets repeated by generations 
of professors and students with remarkably little 
in the way of actual demonstration.   The few 
computer simulations that have attempted it, found 
myriad “general equilibrium theory” equilibria, 
and no way to actually predict with one a particular 
economy would choose (when any sort of realistic 
assumptions about human choice behavior were 
input).   Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees marveled 
at the appearance on a large scale of goods from 
the appearance on a small scale of bads and vice 
versa.   Adam Smith and Mandeville did not work 
out exactly how this happens the way Schelling did 
hundreds of years later (Schelling, 1978).  Schelling’s 
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work made clear that local scale selfi shness was not 
able to achieve global scale generosity without lots 
of particular intervening conditions, unlikely to be 
obtained by chance.   It was by discounting myriad 
positive social forces, values, traditions, and behavior 
patterns that Adam Smith’s and Mandeville’s 
invisible hands could be seen as magically turning 
bads into goods.   Without myr iad at tendant 
conditions the invisible hand worked harm.   So 
much of economics is this way--promises of easy 
good disappearing once actual full accounting for 
needed conditions appears.   Complexity increases 
when invisible hand ideologies keep people from 
looking for or cause them to forbid discussing forces 
needed to make invisible hand magical turning of 
selfi shnesses into generosities appear.   The attendant 
forces are not looked for or, found, not talked about 
and admitted.   
Fundamentalism- - Complexity from Fleeing 
Complexity into Rigid Past-like Hiding Places 
(Arendt, 1971; Kotkin, 1993; Giddens, 1991)
Full fl ight from complexity leads one to putting 
some authority over all others, by magical wish, 
magical incantation, or other dubious wish-driven 
method.   It leads to letting something other than you 
work out what is right and wrong and how people 
should live.   It amounts to passing on the world 
of solving and getting answers to some authority 
or book or clique, so you yourself do not have the 
anxiety and mental work load of fi guring out things 
for yourself.   Fundamentalism is the name we give 
to people in full fl ight from the diversity, complexity, 
and mental work load of modern living.   They 
run as fast as they can to the past, to some god, to 
some book, to someone else, to some guru, who, 
instead of them, has fi gured out everything and 
tells them the answers, even to situations never in 
the world before.   Complexity increases when you 
fl ee from reality because you do not see and deal 
with the actual causal forces and consequences 
in reality.   Fundamentalism is the counterpart to 
futurism--living in the past or living in the future, 
versus living in the actual present. 
I n h e r e n t  L i m i t a t i o n s  i n  H u m a n  
Thought- -Complexity from Us As a Machine 
Not Being More Capable than Our Situations as 
Machines 
(March,  1988; Morgan and Henrion,  1990; 
Cook and Levi, 1990; Janis and Mann, 1977; 
Piatelli-Palmarini, 1994; Nisbett and Ross, 1980; 
Jervis, 1997; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Myers, 
2001; Arkes and Hammond, 1986; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000; Levy, 1997; Baron, 2000; Nussbaum, 
2001; Klein, 1998; Plotkin, 1993)
There are three stages of this argument.  The fi rst 
is made by social psychologists, at the core of which 
is Kahnemann and Tversky’s Nobel work on prospect 
theory, proving that humans do not optimize their 
own utility or even have the ability to know what it 
is.   The second is made by other social psychologists 
showing how such social psychological limitations 
of thought are not universal but change in different 
cultures and change over time--training can turn 
Japanese forms of cognition into American and vice 
versa.   The third is a more abstract and perhaps 
ultimately powerful argument by Wolfram that the 
simple programs underlying all phenomena in the 
universe, including everything we wish to understand 
and how our own brains operate, are computationally 
equivalent.   We will never be capable of thought 
formally more powerful than many of the phenomena 
we wish to predict behavior of, so there will more and 
more parts of reality we fi nd we can never predict. 
Complexity increases when humans are not rational 
as they wish to think they are, when how people 
think is not the same in different cultures, and when 
no possible genetically engineered improvement in 
human brain function or linking of societies of brains 
can make us computationally superior to many of the 
most important parts of reality we wish to understand 
and infl uence, predict and control.   
Self Knowledge--Complexity from Being 
Civilizationally Unable to See Parts of Reality 
(Tannen, 1990; Olson, 1962; Elliott, 2001; Ferrari 
and Sternberg, 1998; Ashworth, 2000; Fox, 2003; de 
Beauvoir, 1949; Diener and Suh, 2000)
Tannen’s work on differences between male and 
female discourse, in the 1970s and 1980s became 
best-seller books, copied by major publishers in 
the 1990s.  Taking her research as a whole, the 
point it makes is, entire civilizations and societies, 
by slighting and downgrading the importance or 
even existence of female forms of discourse and 
cognition, severely dysfunctioned.  Add to this 
recent work showing how technical platforms and 
new technologies, widely promoted as workplace 
improvements worldwide are really disguises for 
making workplaces more feminine (Greene, 1999), 
and you see blind spots that take hundreds of years 
to become visible.   Church doctrine in Europe for 
1000 years prevented the laws of motion from being 
discovered and used as technical bases.   Church 
doctrine blinded people to laws of nature, made it 
impossible for people to see them.   The history of 
such blind spots makes us rather certain that we today 
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operate within similar civilizational scale blindspots 
that will not become apparent for hundreds of years. 
Complexity increases when reality aspects of lost to 
site and infl uence by bias, ignorance, or civilizational 
scale blindness.   The dynamics and forces actually 
operate and produce effects but, because we cannot 
see these dynamics and forces, the effects surprise 
and disrupt us, making life more complex than it 
otherwise would be.  
Changes in Commonsense--from Mechanosense 
to Biosense 
(Wolfram, 2002; Johnson, 1995; Bailey, 1996; 
Cilliers, 1999; Schelling, 1978; Giddens, 1991; Olson, 
Malone et al, 2001)
New generat ions of people l ive in worlds 
different than their parents.   Parents cannot imagine 
what the differences of condition, the different hopes 
and fears of growing up, are and how they affect 
generations of children.   The result is always two 
competing forms of commonsense or more operating 
in organizations and societies that mix age groups. 
In the early 21st century you could observe a shift 
from physics and the edge of science to biology, and 
with it admiration for mechanical things shifting to 
admiration for biologic things.   Steel, admired for 
its strength looked vastly inferior to bone, for bone 
grows stronger as it is used and where it is most used, 
and bone repairs itself.   Steel does none of these 
things.   MIT materials scientists aspire to bone-like 
material inventions now, rather than steel-like ones. 
When commonsenses clash discussions become 
irrational for people are unaware of the contents of 
their own commonsense.  All they observe is others 
“lacking” commonsense, meaning, lacking their 
particular commonsense.    Add generational change 
to this and you get policy fi ghts and irrationality 
fed by inter-generational differences of automatic 
valuing and assumptions of things.  This increases 
complexity. 
Active (Situational) Sources of 
Complexity--Expanding Situation Scope
All the above passive sources of complexity 
cause complexity increase by shrinking the human 
actor in the face of expanding situation options 
and contents.   With each individual more partial, 
the same conditions facing them, overwhelm them 
and their capabilities easier.   Each individual is 
a narrower and narrower look at and talent for 
response.   It takes more individuals more complexly 
arranged to achieve any one overall effect.   Passive 
increase in complexity is founded on increases in 
human partiality, reduction in personal scale in 
relation to growing situational scope. Active sources 
of complexity are not concerned with individuals 
but with the situations they face.    It is impossible 
to cover and present comprehensively all forms of 
situational complexity in any paper of reasonable size 
so I have chosen to present immense surveys, done in 
previous work, here, as references to readers as they 
read the further arguments below.  The particular 
models below were the most comprehensive 
published at the time of their fi rst publishing.  
Non-Linear Effects 
(Hardin, 1985; Jervis, 1997; Sornette, 2003; Casti, 
1991; Casti, 1997; Cowna, 1994; Andersson et al, 
1997; Kauffman, 2000; Kauffman, 1995; Johnson, 
1995; Kelly, 1994; Kenrick, 2001; Schellling, 1978; 
Svyantek, 2000; Vallacher and Nowak, 1994; Watts, 
1999; Yates, 1987) 
There are three reasons that life and work are 
becoming more and more non-linear.   First, humans 
via personal computing no longer need to use linear 
models of reality because handling non-linear 
math is costly.  Non-linear math has been made 
no longer an obstacle due to the spread of personal 
computing.  Therefore, our pretenses in models 
that reality was non-linear have dropped away.  We 
now openly admit and address the non-linearity 
that was always there in most situations.  Second, 
situations that were not non-linear have become 
non - l inear.   Mass - issifi ca - t ion of products, 
transport, communication--has increased options 
and inter-actions through global and national 
economies, polities, and cultures.  Thirdly, new 
situations have appeared that are non - linear. 
Venture business districts, copying Silicon Valley, 
have spread worldwide with specifi c institutional 
arrangements for lubricating exchange of ideas, 
personnel, technologies, and services among fi rms. 
Non-linear actions there have strongly non-linear 
consequences.   Below I present a large model (the 
largest yet published) of distinct non-linear “surprise” 
phenomena from over 20 different fi elds.   A book 
describing each with method for handling them exists 
(Greene, Management of Non-Linearity, 2004).   In 
this paper, the point I wish to make with the diagram 
below is this--that non-linearity constitutes most 
of the parts of the world we have problems with. 
Indeed, languages have sayings from hundreds and 
thousands of years ago.   Most such sayings directly 
describe or name non-linear phenomena from the 
charts below (example, “a stitch in time saves nine”, 
“let sleeping dogs lie”, etc.).   Non-linearity has a 
long lineage in human history.   
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unplanned second order effects
ownerless problems
emergents from interactions
partial solution lowers standards
side-effects counteract main one
act combines counter intent
staff combines
counter intent
launch manner counters intent
self-reinforcing growth self limits
moderate solution bad so miss good larger one
side-effects of result worse than benefits of 
result
result done is not satisfying/wanted
similar input very different outputs
usual input whole system changes
fast good results then huge bad ones
solution with delayed huge cost
cause at problem locale only is attacked
cause of other causes not attacked
system caused variation “solved” w/o system 
changes
big environment caused failure blamed on 
weak/1 component
other part as envt undoes 1 part fn
lack of leeway in other parts stifles 1 part’s 
function
environment changes during solving
solution so particular to 1 environment cannot 
be used
credit & rewards not to those who solved
outside help used till own capability atrophies
great solution for situation too weak to last
great solution gets enemies cuz of who supports 
it
enough chaos: local act effect goes unnoticed
enough order: local act cannot affect system
sequence of solving exacerbate user dissatisfactn
solution delivery configuration harms
people plan and intend wanted outcomes not envisioning responses of myriad 
involved system elements/forces/persons
problems without obvious owner, beyond simple profession boundaries often too 
unfocused for any one group to handle
totally unplanned outcomes often emerge from the myriad parts of systems 
interacting as a result of 1 or several moves/initiatives
partial successes often change people’s ambitions or criteria of success lower, so 
accept transient solution that go away
many side-effects directly counter the main intended effect, undoing it, or distracting 
from it via huge costs worse than want
the actions done to reach a goal though individually toward goal combine to counter 
the goal
the people working to reach goal though individually helping reach it combine to 
prevent it happening
the manner a solution is launched with counters overall intent
an act can have result that cause more such results continually till negative feedback 
self limit process grows big and reverses 
when initial small solution tries fail badly, people give up and miss fact that much 
larger such tries would work well
the side-effects may be much worse than the benefits of getting the intended main 
effects
some intended results when actually attained and experienced do not satisfy
similar inputs, even extremely similar ones, can produce extremely different output 
types in any non-linear system
an input just like usual ones done many times already can yet produce entirely 
different never seen before results
early or easy initial results can be good lulling people till huge bad ones suddenly 
emerge from unseen negative feedback force
good solutions can work well in many respects till people notice huge negative costs 
that are delayed often considerably
people can completely handle causes acting near where problem appears and thereby 
miss many other bigger causes acting in far flung other parts of the system
many causes can be handled well but since what causes them is left untouched 
problem reappears continually, especially when one cause after another is handled
when design or configuration of the system causes some problem, solutions that miss 
it will allow the problem to reappear
environment or whole system design caused failure gets blamed on one component or 
weak one, letting problem reappear
functions of one system part can be undone or blocked or made harmful by functions 
of other parts acting as environment of it
each part doing its own function very well can cause overall failure because they do 
not have leeway helping each other do their individual functions well
the solving process can take enough time that the environment around it changes so as 
to undo its effects
 a solution can be so particular to 1 environment that it cannot be used or its effects 
are transient as the environment evolves
systems can reward people who did not actually solve so in the future they do not 
solve things
outside help can assist you so long and well that your ability to live without it 
atrophies causing disaster when it is no longer available
great solutions can be too weak to last and keep problems at bay
great solution can assemble and motivate scattered ones who dislike it or who does it 
or fame from the doing of it
enough chaos can prevail that good effects go unnoticed and unappreciated
tight interconnections in a system can make for such stasis that nothing can change 
enough to constitute solution of problems
the particular sequence of acts in a solution process can create user dissatisfaction that 
overwhelms their overall result





















































































when get what want, dislike it
when live with result, hate it
solving process raises expectations so hate result
representative of customer’s spec are wrong
producers become/supplant customers
during production parts/requirements change
parts hijacked during production 
way something produced kills interest
factors from unincluded profession, kill
profession not customers make requirements
inter-profession disagreement on basics







overkill solutions or cut vital stuff as waste
overly incremental solutions
solution perfect for present situation only
parts config lost in responding so problems 
reappear
new parts added rather than reconfigure old ones
culture of designers narrower than culture of 
customers
social ranks block feedback flows
firms or department functions block feedback 
flows
single solver pushed to heroics because alone
committee forced unneeded diversity
people getting less than needed can try harder, getting even less, so trying harder till 
no common resource is left
those with slight initial resource advantages can be so favored with results that their 
advantages grow hugely
several parties can undermine their competitors’ prices, till everyone together goes 
broke
successes can produce such envy caused isolation that benefits are unusable
 
people can find negatives of losing goal to achieve outweigh attaining concrete goals
people can find that experienced result dissatisfies them
solving process can raise expectations to than any likely result dissatisfies
how we represent what the customer requires can distort or miss actual customer 
requirements or miss customer changes
the requirements of producers can supplant needs of customers in projects so 
customer hate the result
while producing something enough time elapses that components or overall 
requirements change
parts during a project get noticed by others and taken for other purposes
the way something is done can undermine the purpose behind it
professions omitted from an effort usually have been omitted because they have vital 
but unpopular knowledge needed by it
producers of a project or designers of it may supplant requirements of customer of it 
with their own requirements
the plural diverse professions required by a project may be unable to agree on even 
the most basic aspects of it
solutions may dwarf in complexity the problems they are to solve
the world cannot be trusted, withdraw and minimize harm--this attitude makes the 
world horrid so withdrawal is needed
the world is dangerous and untrustable, we have only each other, so stick together 
above all--this drives merit away
small errors and big errors have mild consequences, the world is trustable so anything 
goes--this eventually produce disasters
parts of the world are very dangerous, parts okay, must know boundaries--this 
eventually produces dated distinctions
the scale of problem/causal elements differs from the scale of solution elements
the scale of problem/causal elements differs from the scale of solution elements
the scale of problem/causal elements differs from the scale of solution elements
solution too incremental may allow drastic changes of situation during long 
implementation periods
solutions may be so specialized around current situation that slight changes of 
environment vitiate them
inter-relations needed among solution components may be lost during the chaos of 
implementation so problems reappear
situations tend to get solved by adding things rather than replacing present things so 
complexity builds and dissipates efforts
the culture of designers/solvers may be so much narrower than that of customers of a system 
that requirements of customers get missed or distorted terribly making outcomes unfit
social status and merit rankings can be boundaries across which feedbacks do not 
flow so leaders miss results of their own acts
functional departments of sets of firms may block the flow of feedback so leaders 
miss results of their own acts
solvers acting alone may be driven to extreme heroic level efforts that, lacking 
subtlety and patience, ruin solutions
committees doing solutions may force forms of diversity on a project that disintegrate 
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long cycle times allow time for many errors
giant greenfield initiatives that don’t build on 
past
career system rewards distinguishing self from 
others not building on their work
aggressive specs that ignore real capabilities
long cycle times allow many outside market 
changes
many changes of requirements
marketers “know” customers but don’t and don’t 
see engineers as their customers
one-product projects when all know competition 
will instantly respond
long cycle times allow many changes of 
personnel
one old generation manages so younger 
imaginations shut out except crises
unfunded capability development so must invent 
product and technology together
early phases understaffed/funded; unrealistic 
schedules from remote leaders
products/projects often cancelled
no manager action till problems are huge
resources adequate only at product end
subsystem team arguments escalate cuz refuse 
trade-offs
team members not co-located; global suppliers 
jerked around without context
unprincipled management causes waits for many 
sign offs
travel, waiting, reporting are most of 
development work time
reviews distort actual capabilities
no incentives for needed behaviors: building 
reliable technology
leaders remote and ignorant, do not like nuts and 
bolts solving
waiting till problems huge then killing entire 
project preferred as it spreads blame
no personal, social, knowledge basis for inter-
manager agreement, so solution is political
managers lack the social skills to guide without 
punitiveness
managers force symptom only solving by tacit 
intimidation
promotions not based on actual problems faced 
and solved
no consensus building process on product 
strategies
no building on success/failure of previous teams
missing project postmortems
tradition of hiding slack time and no one covering 
for others on team; no pain sharing system
creativity valued over effectiveness
long cycle times for doing things allow time for many errors to accumulate
totally new goals and means in a project fail to link to already built up and tested 
capabilities, making achievements unstable
career systems can end up rewarding flashy launches of new initiatives not patient solid 
doing of hard long things, so rewards can reduce building on work of others or cooperating
leaders can force extreme specs utterly unconnected with actual people and process 
capabilities
long cycle times in a project give time for outside environment, customer, and market 
changes to undermine what is done
requirements that specify what a project does can continually change during doing of 
the project making designs chaotic
marketers can substitute own bias for what customers really want and can impose not 
effectively communicate requirements to engineers
major one outcome efforts can demoralize entire workforces who know competitors 
will instantly respond to any one innovation actually done
long cycle times for a project allow time for key staff to change, retire, or lose interest 
reducing skill and quality
stable fixed old leadership generations controlling all shut out, always without exception, 
younger imaginations or force re-interpretation mistakes onto projects till failure results
product development gets funded but not development of reliable new technology such 
products use so projects jointly develop both, making performance achieved unreliable
old projects always late so early phases of new projects are understaffed, causing errors to 
be spotted/fixed expensively later in projects; remote leaders force unrealistic schedules
tradition of leaders suddenly cancelling projects cause entire workforces to 
underinvest in projects till nearly completed
hierarchies can cause local problems to get unresolved locally, instead escalating to 
VP level, delaying solutions
managers can fear early resource flows, hold back resources, so errors build up 
expensively treated at project end
subsystem teams may refuse trade-offs among each other, hence, escalate arguments 
to VP level, delaying solutions
teams split geographically can result in “in” groups jerking other around suddenly 
without context, warning, or consideration of local conditions and capabilities
hierarchies can impose levels of permissions which only serve to delay key actions 
through projects dangerously
the logistics of communicating and documenting a project can become half or more 
of all work, supplanting real design
leader reviews can be unprofessional due to remote leaders or delusional due to leader 
political distortions of reality
all the incentives in a project can favor errorlessly and quickly doing things impossible to due 
errorlessly and quickly without development of technique/technology base that is unfunded
Western leaders want social class superiority to workers hence do not get hands dirty, 
lose sense of real capability, become totally dependent on politics distorted reports
leaders prefer to let problems grow so huge that they kill entire projects as that spreads 
blame beyond one leader; smaller problems can be blamed on one leader so dangerous
managers so competitive that no rational negotiated solitons are possible among them, 
instead only political agreements are possible making technically irrational solutions
managers may lack the social skills to work with or encourage own employees, instead, 
such managers are hated whenever they are around others, acting punitively among them
managers unwilling to imagine or solve deep issues or political ones, may force 
solving of only superficial aspects by intimidating people
leaders may be recognized and promoted based on things other than actual problems faced 
and solved so incompetent contexts in higher leaders judge/distort lower competent ones
overall product strategies of a group may be contested and not agreed on so individual 
projects do not add up or synergize
leaders to show own worth may deny worth and value built up by predecessor 
managers, ignoring previous team learnings
leaders may ignore reviews of completed projects to find learnings as they do not 
intend to apply past learning in future
project aspects that cause one role to work harder than others not recognized and equalized 
so people hide slack and other private benefits that compensate them for unfair work loads
creative solutions that bring visibility may be preferred to humdrum but cheap 
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consulting =  participating
roles assigned by precedent not need
social will not mind used to solve
rotating everyone before an issue
ignore = solve
admit issue = create issue
agreement all interpret different is agreement
agreement fact outweighs content
intolerance of slight differences
information hiding
if new, not an issue, only old issues are issues
copying rivals outweighs inventing solutions
issues are just distraction from real work
good managing = issuelessness
changes in environment interpreted as already 
found inside group
considering whether to do so thorough it = doing
issue generators neutralized coopted early
attitude discrepancies responded to as issues
long standing irrational situation is natural = not 
issue
pay money to all parties = solving
ritual process repetition is work, not issue 
handling
cost of issues is lost focus on unity of group
social surface: establishing a thing called a 
solution = solving
super direct solutions, bypassing causes
easy meeting tradition: discuss = repeat elder 
opinions
group wrongs better than interrupting unity with 
issue
trance-like “no mind” state is ideal consciousness
mastery & automation of routines = ideal action
perfecting everyday life = greatness
issue preventing = garbage collecting
slight disturbance of “no mind” daily life state 
intensely investigated
utter meticulousness of handling trivialities
leaders can consult genba for genba’s reactions then ignore them and consider that a 
participatory system
leaders can structure all present projects just as past ones were ignoring unique needs 
and opportunities of the present
getting everyone to fail together is worth as much as getting everyone to succeed--
togetherness considered solution
rotating all leaders before an issue is considered adequate even if not consensus or 
insight occurs and leaders sleep
ignoring a problem for generations is as good as solving it, the Charlie Brown 
strategy, ignore it till it goes away 
admitting you have a problem is the same as creating the problem--this attitude
consensing on a vaguely worded agreement that everyone interprets completely 
differently considered agreement
social fact of agreement being announced more important than whether anyone really 
agrees with anyone else
slight differences of one group to another, one project to another, hated and resisted, 
forcing all into same mold
hiding information and problems is as good as actual solving--this attitude
new issues are not really issues, only issues that have been seen before are treated as 
issues
copying competitor moves is considered more important than inventing own solutions
issues are considered distractions of real work of doing past routines without thinking
good leading is considered leading that avoids any issues and deals with no issues
environment changes are all assimilated to inside of group already known phenomenon--
so nothing is ever really new, that is, nothing requires new thought or effort
consideration processes are so thorough and long and detailed that they are more 
complicated than actually doing what is considered
any social unit that might generate issues is coopted by payouts early, that is, paid to 
not generate issues
differences of attitude are considered issues so opponent positions are constantly 
folded into own position, remove ing debate
long standing unfair or irrational situations are, because long around, considered non-
issue, and never improved
instead of hard choosing and thought, just pay all parties money to make issues go 
away
following social rituals of consideration considered how to handle issues even if 
solutions not invented or tried
issues considered harmful because they distract people from the mystic unity of the 
group and society
getting everyone to call something, anything, a solution is considered a way to solve 
issues, regardless of whether it really works or changes arrangements in society
getting people to like bad situations is considered good solution, better than removing 
bad situations
meetings that just ritually endorse opinions of whoever is oldest in the meeting, after 
consulting/ignoring everyone
wrongs perpetuated by a community are better than disrupting community by 
eliminating such wrong at cost of lost unity
clear minds, without issues, is a goal of governing
action is ideally the mastery and automatic repetition of old established routines, not 
the hectic scurrying to solve issues
inventing and living a perfected polished smooth everyday life personally is what 
society issue handling is for
preventing issues is the same as garbage collecting in importance
anytime and anywhere people get interested in issues is a real problem for society and 
must be stopped
tremendous detail and administrative power applied to trivial disturbances of clear 

























































































self conscious evolving system
complexity from simplicity
dangerous safety measures





basic units resist change
non-consensus based existence
relations determined relations
cats cause flowers indirectness
delayed effects
time fractality
second best become disaster
theoretical best = actual worst




similar inputs different outputs
diminish returns critical mass
effect from other effects
input increase reverses effect
variable order change outcome
action timing
transient factor effects endure
hysteresis: path dependence
failing variable may yet be OK
gradual vs. leap to big input
blame fails
bad people illusion
instead of groups and individual actors by action making power, most comes from 
their position in systems
instead of groups and individual actors by action making their behavior, most comes 
from their position in systems
wholes have traits not found in any of their parts
systems whose parts think (consciously react) and evolve nearly never do just what is 
planned or intended
from simple local actors interacting by simple local rules, global complexity can 
emerge
safety measures increase unsafe driving habits causing more injury not more safety
humans acting in social systems can never do only 1 thing or only what is intended
the system has traits different from traits of its parts, which system traits change 
context of parts traits = meaning changes
more tightly linked systems are efficient but subject to widespread failure when small 
faults appear
many interdependencies mean basic units resist all changes because relations to other 
units would also have to change
some system elements exist only because other elements must consense to eliminate 
them, consensus is hard
relations between some actors determined by relations between other actors, not 
between each other
extreme indirectness of effects--cats eat mice which therefore cannot eat seeds, 
causing 1 flower type to dominate/appear
hard to declare any policy/intervention a success because time period of side-effects 
is fractal, multiple size scale
second best conditions do not produce second best outcome in non-linear systems, but 
often disasters
best in theory can be terrible in practice
context (system parts near) of actor different than act viewers so intended meaning 
not seen meaning
our response to this instance seen as info about our response to future similar 
instances by others in system
others’ reaction to our actions change our preferences, acts, and self image, and 
reactions to their actions
parallel micro-environments and deployed changes taken up by parallel micro-
environments
similar inputs can have vastly different outputs
output decline after certain level of inputs; output appears after certain level of inputs
an effect’s existence depends on presence of certain other effects/variables
ex: incentive to act morally reduces moral action; increase in input increases output 
for a while then suddenly decreases it
order in which variables act changes outcome produced; ex: baby before not after 
marriage
when in process plea or proposal happens determines what outcome they produce or 
tend towards
effects of a factor that ceases to exist can yet endure far beyond lifespan of factor that 
created them; ex: found firm
outcome may vary on how variables attained key values; ex: water flow from open 
vs. closed faucet
a variable change may fail to produce an outcome not because it is wrong variable but 
cuz other variables needed also
gradual steps to some input value may not produce same output as single leap to same 
input value
effect of one variable depends on others so blaming one variable nearly always wrong
people bad in one team can be great in another; worth is relative to environment 
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plural OKs = disaster
futile to improve 1 part
false polarities
evolved over designed traits





reaction to others’ expectations
blinded by seeing
blind to origins of own strategy
phony proposing
actuals vs images tactics
reacting to environment I create
interaction as environment
want what denied
greener grass on other side illusn
repetition is not repetition
blame environment I created
self fulfilling prophesy
fatal solutions
control is less powerful
counter effects
user not giver context
incentive gaming
target population evolves
designed outcomes = inputs
with X without X illusion
do A vs. B in case illusion
power relativity
motive of act indeterminate
several slight, individually negligible, faults together can cause disastrous outcome
even giant improvements in one factor can have no effect or bad effect on wanted 
outcome
nature versus nurture type arguments are false because they each are environment for 
each other; they are a system
evolved traits tend to be far superior to designed traits because invented relative to 
actual environments encountered
inadequate first measures can exacerbate a situation while drawing attention making 
it look worse,so crisis expands involvement
people bad in one team can be great in another; worth is relative to environment 
challenge of other personalities interacting
European softness proved “better” than US hardness, BUT because US hardness was 
context, established by deeds
view 1 enemy policy, miss actual & possible others and relations among actual and 
possible others as the “1’s” meaning
professionals surprised when what works for years gradually fails BUT audience 
changed;ex:rank colleges but fit= worth
actors react to what other actors expect; ex: A thinks X hard so Y tries it and wins cuz 
of A’s expectations
my clarity on my motives causes me to miss that B mistakes what my motives are, so 
I misinterpret wat B’s motives are
I use strategy X with present opponent W because my previous opponent used 
strategy Y, but W is not Y
many proposals, threats, actions are done because we know or expect other will 
ignore or stop them, so not genuinely meant
tactics that weaken me actually can make me stronger cuz of effects of image I create; 
arm spending excess = strong image
result of my actions become environment determining further actions I take and 
results I aim for/achieve; over-react movts.
interaction can change aims, beliefs, capabilities of actors; conflict can harden, 
extremize, mobilize enemies
interactions become experiences that change our aims, so we want what is denied us 
more than before denial came
we imagine our self with different situation, partner but it is not same self relating 
thusly to different things, =not better
repeated inputs can produce very different outputs cuz 1st results form new 
environment of action;Hitler Czeck/Poland
ex: he hates me so I do it, but I provoked him to hate me, then use result to justify my 
initial provoking
I fear X, defensive build up that provokes X to fear me, justifying my initial fear
plans and designs not = results; ex: oil spill clean up increases overall pollution
total control to do incenting acts less powerful that likelihood of error, that 
uncertainty forces cooperation 
Titanic-safety = careless = danger, ban X = X popular = more X, 
aid or acts given used entirely differently than planned if use context differs from 
what givers assumed: 
following incentive leads to bad behaviors: increasing measures supplants service 
impact;
target population of incentives change when incentives seen; ex: aid draws self 
supporters into dependency as easier way 3
mandated, directly imposed, outcomes are inputs guaranteeing unforeseen bad 
outcomes later:WWI’s peace causesWW2
functional substitutes for X abound so without X cases may have X by other means 
not seen
cannot find identical real cases so difference in results of A vs B from context or 
evolution differences not seen
real & imagined alternatives by us and opponents/peers determine power/fear so 
generally cannot determine
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success illusion
last method worked illusion
see what works several try illusion
act in own interest fails
unplanned results okay
solutions look like failures
variable fails/works illusion
anticipate info effects of acts
indicator meaning indeterminate






same input plus once minus later
success creates failure
unstable pride & depression
self limiting acts
info caused negative feedback
changes create changes
ideologic poles shift ground
expectations inflated to zero
what works undoes itself
escalation by identity change
escalation by public privates
preparations become actuals
accelerating mutualism
increasing returns to scale
vaporware, success expectation
escalation by learning costs
lock in, rich get richer in network
getting wanted result shifts attention elsewhere, others see so result eroded:speed fees 
cut speedg&police=more speedg
last in series of negotiations worked so method there is good but only worked cuz 
context set by earlier methods
cannot make several tries cuz each try changes context
many actions directly in own interest hurt own interest cuz others reactions; repress 
revolt increases revolters
people use treatments for own purposes (in own context) so unplanned results 
inevitable
solutions applied at priority problem/crisis areas/times so often fail but still great 
value cuz context=extreme challenge
variable X fails or works in some cases means nothing cuz those cases when X used 
are special or extreme somehow
when actors know being watched for info on future reactions, changes how act now
if less of those accepted come maybe cuz we are bad or cuz bad ones don’t bother 
applying
any intelligent person can distort unmeasured variables to get indicator “high” at huge 
or counter costs
indicators can indicate success steps in small increments encouraging inadequate 
scale efforts till real causes overwhelm
indicators not focussed on real causes or less distributed or numerous distract from 
needed causal work
positive = growth, negative = stable systems, escalation = symmetric growth, 
appeasement = compensatory change
within individuals--feeling an emotion makes it bigger;
between levels--alignment/constraint cascades
arms races show positive feedback at ind.l actor level produces negative feedback at 
relationship, dyad, level
predator/prey cycles example; winners create envy (neg) but further wins create 
partnering/adoption (pos)
expansion creates fear become easier expansion becomes too much expansion till 
collapse
pride makes more trying till overextension collapse; loss makes less investment so 
more depression till collapse
imposed concession produces powerful negative fdbk; successful methods get copied 
losing their advantage
lock on door tells thieves where to steal from: success atrophies collaboration skills so no 
help in hard times= failure: using signal causes signal to end (acting on rumor ends it)
one change creates new issues becoming further changes; feedbacks between fdbk 
cycles evolve laterally
dialectic of bigoted responses automated so moves between poles are lateral shiftings 
of ground
process of implementing design can inflate expectation till they undermine outcome 
satisfaction forcing new initiative
what works gets copied till org has too little diversity to handle environment change, 
so success self moderating
I did bad thing, so I am bad, so I might as well do more bad things: media say bank 
weak so it becomes weak
if I see others actualizing what I only wish, my wish become action, causing still 
others to act = movement
I fear X so prepare for it and gather tools and resource for it that appear waste, so they 
lobby me for actualizing X
integration creates niches for further types of integration
for knowledge products, increasing sales does not increase  costs, so prices drop 
greatly increasing sales
if success is expected then product succeeds so competition to look most likely to 
succeed
if better alternative requires much unlearning then it is not chosen

































































































































Tools for Handling System Effects Well
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reform causes revolution
reporters create news




undo customer stand-ins in system
self justifying effect study
steer emergents
tune system interactions
do population of strategies at once
stop by extrema
domino paradox
move opposite to your goals
attract by rejecting
stopping continual not 1 time
2 acts: for goal for side-effects
act in twos





pluralize units of competition
distribute probs, causes, solutions
act against cause of causes
distinguish system/special causes
evolving wants & satisfaction




rulers fear small reforms will get out of hand so no reforms so revolution ensues
reporters ask leaders about stories they want to cover, causing remark-news
first victories make second easier so later conquests are more and more nominal till 
conquest overall is fluff
violation/news/visibility/sales/wealth; greed/striving/compete/ideas/wealth; 
care/depend/control/helpless/care;
reduce non-linearity of reaction
monitor results of actions on larger and smaller system size scales
find requirements of functions, professions, leaders etc. substituting themselves for 
what customer require and undo
people study second order effects only if and where consonant with biases and 
wanted results
use emergent side-effects steered to attain your goal
till wanted emergents appear; connectedness, diversity, patchings parameters
do multiple contradictory strategies at once, observing side-effects & results, then 
join emergent winners
tip into chaos to stop, tip into stasis to stop, tip into cycling to stop, 
small losses erode image so act boldly after small losses
use reactions to that by others/competitors to attain your goal
attracting by playing hard to get
blocked action produces work-arounds so continual new blockings are needed if you 
wish to stop some action
act dually, one to attain goal, one to handle side-effects of attaining goal
acts that appeal to A and that appeal to A’s enemy
do actions whose only purpose is eliciting side-effects which are your wanted main-
effects, slough main-effects
influence others by creating environments they adapt to
design each system component to do its role while adjusting to help adjacent 
“environment” parts to do their roles
mobilize all usually ranked, separated, professioned things across borders to envision 
and implement solutions
manage processes till transparent to wants of customers they serve
mobilize network of diverse types of firm/org in scale with system causation of 
phenomena/opportunities faced
distribute throughout entire system problematic aspects, causes of local problems, 
solutions to undo causes
determine root causes generating other causes as symptoms then address the roots, 
distributed throughout system
address variations in outcome from traits inherent in system’s design from transient 
happenstance circumstances
find wants unwanted when appear, solution not satisfactory when experienced, design 
for contexts and outcomes
producers of a project tend to supplant their needs for end users of the project’s 
product
investigate problems not fitting existing professions that fall between cracks
find projects whose customers continually change requirements during design and 
stabilize as staged deliverables
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Diverse Forms of Social Diversity (Pheysey, 1993; Denbison, 1990; Trice and Beyer, 1993; Raelin, 1991; Paul et al, 1994; Bledstein,
1976; Kotkin, 1993; Berger, 1991; Tannen, 1990; Rasmussen and Rauner, 1996; Crane, 2002; Munch and Smelser, 1992; Alexander and Seidman,
1990; Smith and bond, 1999; Berry et al, 1992; Nisbett, 2003; Scollon, 1995; Shweder, 1991; Stigler et al, 1990) 
Social diversity slows decisions and development of cooperation but improves quality of outputs, previous research has found.   The twin errors of 
relativism and authoritarianism/fundamentalism come from despair over facing diversity.   Some people give in to it, refusing to handle the mental work 
load it requires and other people flee from it into something unreal but simpler they can let face things for them so they do not have to do hard mental work 
themselves.    Geographic globalization forces people into interior reflection as they come face to face with ways of being they have never encountered 
before.   The journey out is a journey in, Joseph Campbell says (Campbell, 1949; 1986).   There are many diverse forms of social diversity to encounter.   
However, there are few published maps of this diversity.   The table below presents one previously published one.
Most fundamental when facing diverse forms of social diversity is a way to characterize and therefore distinguish precisely the unwitting unconscious 
assumptions found there but not admitted or recognized by most people and institutions.   We all grow up learning things we are unaware we are learning so 
as adults, the people we encounter rarely know most of the values and attitudes and choice repertoires they operate on.  Before we can make them aware of 
what operates in them that they are unaware of, we have to have a way of characterizing and expressing it precisely.   Hence, facing social diversity of all 
forms, requires ability to model differences of culture.   Previous research developed the following 64 dimensions for distinguishing cultures, combining 
quite a bit of research on characterizing cultures.   In this regard it should be mentioned that sets of business practices, like just-in-time manufacturing, 
enterprise resource management, re-engineering, total quality, and dozens of others, each have their own distinct cultures, distinguishable using the 
dimensions in the model below.  
recognizing plural possible reactions to diversity scenarios;
recognizing your own propensities along ambiguous dimensions of response to diversity; 
recognizing social, cognitive and other dimensions to responding to diverse situations; 
recognizing your own stage of penetrating a diverse situation/culture; 
recognizing your own stage of personality development; 
recognizing cognitive step sequence in responding to diversity; 
recognizing illusions all people have about the nature of values and cultures; 
recognizing the uses to which culture is put in business situations; 
recognizing the other guy’s way of doing things; learning to do things the other guy’s way; 
undoing unconsciousness of costs of talents; 
undoing unconscious value commitments made in the process of growing up (socialization); 
undoing power given over to outsider institutions while growing up;
undoing commitment to plans and process not outcome; 
undoing casual dropping of self-reflection in daily life; 
undoing    	 
 to situations; 
undoing ignoring implicit culture supports and blocks to business practices; 
undoing common bounds and intensities of doing mundane work tasks; 
undoing information shifts to diversify results rather than people shifts; 
balancing how management functions are delivered where and when and in the amount needed; 
balancing costs of improvement among people at work; 
balancing (and recognizing imbalances among) dynamics of various comprehensive models of all the diverse elements at work; 
balancing types of remarks in meetings; 
balancing causal analysis types; 
balancing types of topics, types of treatments of topics, and leaders of treatments in meeting and work process assignments;
balancing public display of excellent word and deed with functional appearance opportunities for employees at work; 
balancing emotional infrastructure in support of needed transitions with rational requirements; 
balancing need to specialize with need for organizational learning and parallel processing; 
scripting what you are having feeling about
scripting the interplay of different frames for viewing the same action stream
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New Forms of Computational System
(Ilgen and Hulin, 2000; Prietula et al, 1998; 
Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1990; Carley and Prietula, 
1994; Gilbert and Conte, 1995; Hannon and ruth, 
1994; Gaylord and D’Andria, 1998; Epstein and 
Axtell, 1996; Durlauf and Young, 2001; Axelrod, 
1997; Lomi and Larsen, 2001; Casti, 1994; Casti, 
1997; Huggett, 1993; Carley and Prietula, 1994; 
Luna et al, 2000; Kennedy and Eberjart, 2001; 
Bonabeau et al, 1999; Ferber, 1999; Bradshaw, 
1997; Castelfranchi and Werner, 1994; Conte and 
Castelfranchi, 1993; Bentley, 1999; Dowla and 
Rogers, 1995; Davis, 1987; Fogel, 1995; Judd, 
1990; Biethahn et al, 1995; Arbib and Robinson, 
1990; Amit, 1989; de Castro and Timmis, 2003; 
Dasgupta, 2003; Olson et al, 2001; Gibas and 
Jambeck, 2001)
It is obvious to most people that new forms of 
machine computation are being invented inspired 
by how biological systems in nature operate (such as 
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immune computing for computer security systems). 
The inverse is also true, that new biological systems, 
inspired by forms of machine computation are being 
invented (human-designed biological viruses that 
heal lifeforms by machine-life information functions 
or strategic feignts they play, for example).   In 
general machine computation, social computation, 
and biologic computation systems inspire each other, 
making for six relationships among them.   Along 
each of these dimensions we can imagine three 
or more thematic types making for 18 types of 
computation mutually inspired among them.    This 
interaction is a powerful force in many domains 
generating new methods, technologies, and models 
of the world.   In contrast to this plurifi cation of 
computational system type are efforts to simplify 
by abstracting all this computational diversity. 
Wolfram’s reduction of everything to simple 
programs, 255 one dimension cellular automata 
belongs here.
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Scale change  
computing
blackboards, democratic electronics, 
simulated societies, electronic democracy
cellular automata, population 
computations
robot societies, intelligent 
agents (softbots)
multi-media, organizational 
computing, processware, self 
emerging organizations, agile 
economies
virtual persons, virtual organizations, 
cyber persons, cyber spaces
badging, personal locales, 
personal area networks
politicized settings, politicized 
procedures, computed organizations
manage by movement building, 
micro institution development, 
manage by events, global quality, 
social automata leadership
structural reading diagrams, 
fractal model building, fractal 
filing, fractal interfaces, 
chatroom movement building
all people in one cellular space, 
all places 24 hour connected
democratized broadcasting, 
broadcasting unique computational 
resources, automated social 
movement building routine libraries
just-in-time managing, 
participatory art, protocol 
communities
one group as 30, plural leadership 
regimes, marketization of functions
transport locales, outsource 
virtuality
logic, forward/backward reasoning, 
qualitative and fuzzy reasoning, 
expert systems, constraint 
satisfaction, machine senses
artificial intelligence, genetic 
algorithms, neural nets, evolving 
neural nets, Lamarckian 
algorithms, software ecosystems
damage detecting immunity, invader detecting immunity, 
antibody producer ecosystem immunity, accelerated 
natural selection of antibodies immunity, natural 
selection among natural selection algorithms immunity
equilibria to critical systems, 
key variables to populations of 
agents, causal models to 
simulations
self replicating automata, self 
organized criticality, percolation 
systems, fitness landscapes, 
coupled fitness landscapes
living software, self conscious 
software
DNA computers, polymer 
information string computers, 
internet recruitment computer 
networks
quantum substrate computing, 
football stadium computing
social decisions from 
individual preferences
self emergent overall patterns 
from local agent conditions
self emergent patterns of work and task 
accomplishment from individual unit assignments
self emergent organization form 
from work process/capability 
agglomeration
task accomplishment from 
personal relationships
personal information from 
locations
group interfaces from 
individual preferences
emergent outcomes from basic 
unit interactions
models from variety
group space from individual 
space
decentralized systems from 
centralized systems
function type, amount, and 
time needed from regular 
polling
population of intelligent agents 
from single group
the presence of a function from 
the absence of the function
new thoughts/recognitions from 
evolving message/interaction  
patterns
natural selection system from 
myriad invader/damage  
encounters
dynamic understanding from 
static understanding
abstract principles of life sufficient 
to re-create it in new guises from 
natural selection of codes
silicon based lifeforms from 
interacting software programs
computational processes from 
chemical processes
improved types of computing 
from changes of scale
preferences, coalitions, votes








persons present, preferences 
present, facilities settings
basic unit states, 
neighborhoods, interactions
topic names, topic count, topic 
orderings
interests, communities, events
homepages, gateways, search 
engines
polling, protocols, social 
delivery means




nodes states, connectedness 
structure, interaction types per 
connection type
recognition event, variant 
generation, fittest competition
populations of intelligent 
agents, connectedness/diversity/
patchings parameters, wanted 
outcomes
one species evolving, other 
evolving species as environment 
for that one species, adaptation 
to evolving environment
software genes, natural selection among 
those genes, evolved software species
code bearing population of 
chemicals, chemical reactions 
representing semantic 
combinations, calculation outcomes
computational limits, scale change of computer 
components, new computational limits
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New life, same 
substrates

























altering variant generation, 
altering selecting fitness tests, 
altering  reproduction, altering 
inheritance
altering genes, altering gene-
controller genes, altering gene-




society of mind, natural 
selection of thoughts
fractal meditation, hobby 
professionalization, net 
personae
Non-DNA/RNA gene systems, 
Non-protein metabolism systems
Non-carbon-water lifeforms, 
electronic lifeforms (artificial life)
from being to having, from 
perceiving to modeling to 
acting, from others-produced 
self to self-produced self
neurotic selves, neurotic organizations, 
neurotic nationalities, neurotic lives
political ecology, psychic 
ecology, organizational ecologies
Determining rank, determining 
mates/kin, determining territories
traditional community, crisis 
community, mission community
transport-communication infrastructure 
production, leisure class production, 
agricultural surplus production, 
transcendent value production
emergence replacing design, 
flexibility replacing rigidity, bottom 
up social automata replacing top 
down command, horizontal ranking 
by contribution replacing vertical 
ranking by authority
fractal growth, self organization, 
cell types as attractors
directing attention, natural selection of 
behaviors, selfish gene use of organisms
identity maintenance activities, 
mutual grooming, role salience 
dependency activities
ant hill move decisions, bird 
migration decisions, community 
fight/flight decisions
succession, niche evolution, 




improvements in nature from 
improvements in natural 
selection processes
changes of scale of biologic 
innovation from changes of 
scale of genome acted on
interventions in evolving self 
conscious systems that work 
from changes in design 
processes
thoughts from natural selection 
process among possibly 
relevant thoughts
microcosms of all of life’s 
dynamics from functional 
components of life
alternate lifeforms from same 
substrates as present lifeforms
alternate lifeforms on substrates 
other than present lifeforms
smaller more focussed self or 
model from variety of diffuse 
experience
costs of talents from unconscious 
unwanted side-effects of talents
community species structure from 
web flow nd niche dependencies
ordered community from 
individual ambitions
time design from source of 
community confidence
immense infrastructures and 
surpluses from aggregating 
local communities
emergence from design
structures from self organizing 
processes
decisions from natural 
selection processes
relationships from local 
behaviors interacting
group actions from basic unit 
interactions
community structure/function 
changes from interacting 
natural selection processes
adaptation to an environment 
from exploration
generation/selection/reproduction/
inheritance, changes in them 
competing, evolved forms of 
natural selection




(thinking and unthinking), 
community evolutionary 
process changes
a situation description, 
potentially relevant thoughts, 
variants generated from 
potentially relevant thoughts
socially partial roles and places, 
disciplined import of all of life’s 
meanings, re-seen particulars of 
the partial roles and places
code strings, natural selection 
process, metabolism process
code strings, natural selection 
process, metabolism process
unconscious production of a 
self, de-mystification of that 
production process, self-
determined self
talent, consciously known side-effects of 
them, unconsciously known side-effects
species interactions, niches, 
communities
taboos, ritual combat, 
rank/status/kin/territory
sacred time, ritual time, secular 
time
local community aggregations, 
infrastructures, surplus
basic unit states, 
neighborhoods, interactions
populations of agents interacting, self-
organized criticality, avalanche events
attention alternatives, fitness 
contests, attention decisions
local behaviors, interactions, 
relationships
basic unit states, 
neighborhoods, interactions
natural selection processes, 
species evolutionary streams, 
community structures
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Traditional Ways of Simplifying Complexity
The history of civilization is also a history of 
attempts to make complex realities tractable to 
understanding and human scale actions.   Human 
harnessing of nuclear energy, the energy that powers 
the stars, is a 20th century symbol of progress in this 
direction.   Humans learn, master, and control by 
simplifying and focus, it seems.
Leadership--Making People Feel Like They Are 
Going Somewhere 
(March, 1988; Steers et al, 1996; Thomas, 2001; 
Bird et al, 2001; Grint, 2000; Chemers, 1997; van 
MAurik, 2001; Vaill, 1989; Campbell, 1949; Derr et 
al, 2002; Roehner and Syme, 2002) 
A primary function of leadership is making 
people feel like they are going somewhere.   Actual 
research on the overall effectiveness of leadership 
and leaders and various ways of leading has usually 
shown extremely modest if not entirely negative 
results.   A certain somewhat cynical view seems 
to prevail that leaders take credit for luck and avoid 
credit for bad luck as their two most important skills. 
Note, it is not necessary that leaders actually get 
organizations to go somewhere it is only necessary 
that they create the feeling in people that they are 
going.   
Organization--Reducing Options, Neighbors, 
News, and Responsibilities of People 
(Warr, 2002; Applebaum, 1992; John-Steiner, 2000; 
Hirschhorn, 1988; Sternberg et al, 2000; Sternberg 
and Horvath, 1999; Egan, 1994; Zelinsky, 1998; 
Citrin and Smith, 2003; Bourdieu, 1984)
Organization, seen generally and abstractly, 
consists of segmenting.   Organization is reduction 
of scope and scale, nearly entirely.  You take people 
naturally curious about everything and naturally 
feeling entitled to just about everything and you 
turn them by organizing them into limited beings, 
afraid of most contexts and belonging to only a few. 
Organization is the way people hide themselves and 
others from all of responsibility and focus on small 
parts of responsibility.  
Customer Focus--Changing Line of Sight from 
Vertical Hierarchy to Horizontal Divisions 
(Oliver, 1997; Cole et al, 2004; Gaucher and Coffey, 
1993)
All organization tends to focus the attention of 
people upward to their superiors in hierarchies.   This 
inevitably extends till internal career environments 
completely supplant whatever the organization’s 
purpose is in the world at large.   For decades 
computer scientists have noticed that executive 
information systems are only used by executives 
(99.998% of all keystrokes in some corporations in 
typical years) to check their personal stock portfolio 
wealth several times a week or day, nearly never to 
get information for managing the business better. 
This makes academic research on the “effectiveness” 
of such systems both highly suspect and humorous. 
Customer focus saves organizations from extinction 
by supplanting internal hierarchy environments with 
external customer needs as the primary environment 
of everyone’s daily attention.   It simplifi es views 
of the world from career-pluralized narcissisms to 
serving one set of customers well.  
Creativity--Surprising the World More than It 
Surprises You, The Revenge of Inventing 
(Kotkin, 1993; Suleiman, 1996; John-Steiner, 2000; 
Vaill, 1989; Segel, 1987; Gould, 1997; Munck, 2000; 
Israel, 2001; Bourdieu, 1984; Jones and Pennick, 
1995; Gomgnen, 1999; Green, 1986; Weber, 1986)
Creativity is ultimately revenge we take against 
the surprises the world gives us.   We, via creating, 
surprise the world more and faster than it surprises 
us.   In a real way, creating is surprising the world 
precisely as it surprises us.  This is the simplifi cation 
of taking rather than receiving initiative via revenge 
of surprise makers. 
Quality--Making Processes and Products Reliable 
(Bowbrick, 1992; Phadke, 1989; Taguchi, 1986)
The natural world is unreliable in weather, 
seasons, dangers, disease and most other traits. 
Humans have struggled to erect immense artifi cial 
environments, called civilizations, that have the 
character of reliability so missing from our natural 
environment.  Urban dwellers far removed from 
living in nature dismiss or mistake this--they lack 
experience of nature’s whims and their devastating 
effects on human diet, health, and survival.   Most 
service and production systems in the artifi cial 
world we erect to protect us from nature’s vagaries, 
at fi rst, vary unreliably.   Quality is the name of 
systematic efforts of humans to make their artifi cial 
world systems reliable enough to free our minds up 
for other pursuits.   Quality reduces complexity by 
making systems dependable and predictable.  
Re-engineering--Updating Systems as Substrates 
Evolve 
(Greene, Emergent Re-engineering, 1995; Olson, 
2001)
As civilizations diversify and specialize there 
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are more and more parts to them.   As new social 
or technical means get invented for doing various 
functions, it takes time and effort to fi nd where older 
means for doing those functions are at work, and 
to get people there to change values, tools, habits, 
rewards, and other aspects of life.   Re-engineering 
is the name given to this continual human work 
of replacing assumptions about how functions get 
done and assumptions about what social or technical 
material is available for doing it, as a continual 
stream of new assumptions and materials passes 
by.   It reduces complexity by equalizing capabilities 
through society’s systems.  
Networking--Expanding Unit of Imagining and 
Acting, Coordinating, Scale to Match/Surpass 
Problem Scale 
(Leebaert, 1999; Tapscott, 1999; Postrel, 1998; 
Shapiro  and Varian,  1999;  Schi l ler ,  1999;  
Brynjolfsson and Kahin, 2000; Alexander and Pal, 
1998)
Network of trade, communication, political 
alliance and the like are ways that people expand 
their scale of action-taking to match the scale of their 
problems and opportunities.   The clearest view of this 
is asteroids.   Nations of the world unite with rocket 
and nuclear technology to head off asteroids headed 
towards earth.   The scale of alliance is expanded to 
fi t the scale of threat.   
Geographic Globalization--Expanding Unit of 
Acting Scales to Match/Surpass Problem Scale 
(Cole et al, 2004; Cole et al, 2000; Shiba, 1993)
S i m i l a r  t o  n e t wo r k i n g  i s  g e o g r a p h i c  
globalization.  Here geographic scale alone is 
expanded to match the scale of problems and 
opportunities faced.  
Venturing--Specializing Structures Around New 
Products and Services 
(Bhide, 2000; Sahlman, 1999; Swedberg, 2000; 
Brinckerhoff, 2000; Kirzner, 1973; Berger, 1991; 
Bird, et al, 2001; Sexton and Landstrom, 2003; 
Birley and Muzyka, 1997; Shane, 2004; Steyaert and 
Hjorth, 2004; Lee et al, 2000; Fuerst and Geiger, 
2003)
This, like creativity, is a kind of revenge on 
surprise in the world.   You specialize organization 
around ideas so as to surprise the world.   You match 
surprise with your own surprises on the world.   
Industrial Combinatorics--Alliance Capitalism 
Generation of Between-Industry Locales of 
Invention 
(John-Steiner, 2000; Braudel, 1986; Gould et al, 
1997; Bhide, 2000; Swedberg, 2000; Berger, 1991)
The complexity that emerges from gaps between 
nar row human specia l it ies ment ioned at the 
beginning of this article, gets reduced by different 
industries forming combinations and alliances, 
blending their distinct talents to come up with 
systems no one industry could imagine or implement. 
Automatic automobile navigation systems require 
construction companies, car companies, GPS satellite 
companies, cellular communication companies, 
among others, for example.  
Structural Cognition--Operating on Patterns of 
Ideas not Single Ideas 
(Kintsch, 1998; Hobbs, 1990; Myers et al, 1986; 
Titscher et al, 2000; Schiffrin, 1994; Gelman and 
Byrners, 1991)
The mental operations that we all apply to 
individual ideas, can instead be applied to well 
structured patterns of ideas, multiplying cognitive 
productivity by factors of ten or more.   The same 
mental work can, for example, generate 100 plausible 
inventions, in the same time and quality that others 
invent ten, by applying the same operations to entire 
patterns of structured ideas instead of to single ideas. 
Structural cognition is a primary way of expanding 
scale of human thought to match scale of problems 
or opportunities being faced.  The world’s leading 
colleges, in their entrance exams, test for this ability 
in prospective students.  
S t r u c t u r a l  F e e l i n g - - H a v i n g  W h a t  W e  
Were--Managing Traits Instead of Making Them 
What We Are 
(Kegan, 1994; Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; Cannon, 
1991; Maddi, 1996; Diener and Suh, 2000; Roland, 
1988; Shimizu and Levine, 2001; Berry et al, 1992; 
Kasukis et al, 1993)
Our personalities grow when we encounter that 
some aspect of who we are is getting again and 
again in the way of achieving our goals.   When we 
despair of our current self ever getting us to our most 
important goals, that despair furnishes energy, as 
it were, invested in reducing the amount of world 
included in “us”, our identity.  We cut off something 
we formerly considered part of “us” and instead of 
being it we “have” it, that is, manage it.   Thusly, for 
example, we learn to not “be” our opinions, but to 
“have” them.   When you disagree with someone’s 
opinions, if they attack you and defend their views, 
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you are dealing with an adolescent personality, not 
an adult.   Adults by defi nition are people who have 
learned that they are not their opinions but rather 
they are beings that have opinions that they revise 
when new data comes along with better evidence 
properties.   This dynamic of continually shrinking 
what of the world is seen as us and learning to have 
confi dence based on less and less of the world being 
us, reduces complexity by making us a smaller 
and smaller target for psychological attacks on our 
confi dence and goals.   Our happiness, for example, 
does not depend, any longer, on requiring others 
to respect the same friends and people we respect 
because we learn we are not our sets of friends but 
we have friends whom we switch or change as needed 
in life.   
Simple Programs--Using General Computational 
Equivalence to Substitute Simplest Systems for 
Overly Complex ones 
(Wolfram, 2002; Cowan et al, 1994; Kauffman, 
2000; Bak, 1996)
Wolfram introduced this idea that absolutely 
everything that exists, time, space, black holes, 
brains, civilizations, genes uses several of a few basic 
simple program types.   Since many of these simple 
program types are universal computation devices, 
capable of emulating any computation by any 
possible future or present computer or mind, most of 
the universe is exactly as computationally capable 
and complex as our own minds are.  Hence, there 
will be lots of phenomena in the world humans will 
never be able to predict.   This reduces complexity 
by replacing more complex models of all that exists 
with simple program models and it simplifi es human 
goal-making by ruling out predicting certain types of 
phenomena in the world around us.   
Adjacent Beyond--Exponential Expansion of 
Possible Combinations from Each New Invention, 
Niches from Niches, Take-off 
(Kauffman, 2000; Kauffman, 1995; Arthur, 1994) 
Complexity can emerge from the exponential 
growth of combinatorial possibilities as one new 
discovery or technology opens up niches for others. 
Each new element invented expands exponentially 
the number of possible combinations with all past 
elements.  Even if only a small fraction are useful, 
the numbers are immense for any moderately sized 
system.  Reverse this and you get a way to invent 
theories that explain growth phenomena in general. 
A few things combining thusly can rapidly grow 
into an immensely diverse set.  So we can look at 
extremely diverse complex phenomena and wonder 
what small set of combining elements might generate 
it.   This is simplifi cation by reversing take-off 
phenomena of niches spawned by new niches.   
Globalizing Globalization (and Specifi c 
Bodies of Knowledge)
Above two types of source of social complexity 
were delineated, and one set of ways that complexity 
gets reduced was described.  The passive generators 
of complexity, both cognitive and social types, shrink 
human scope, making local humans and groups 
less able, without massive lateral cooperations and 
alliances, capable of tackling the world.   The active 
generators of complexity--types of system surprise, 
types of social diversity, and types of computational 
system--expand situations humans face in terms 
of what can happen and what needs to be faced or 
considered/managed.  The reducers of complexity 
divide into social and mental tactics (as do the active 
and passive sources of complexity).  They work by 
either shrinking scope (of what is faced) or expanding 
scope (of who and what is responding).  We can see 
two patterns running through all this--scale concerns 
as one pattern and the cognitive social divide as 
another pattern.
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The above pat terns prove nothing but are 
suggestive.   They bring to mind a single case of 
an awfully massive multi-decade long effort that 
became a world wide part of businesses everywhere. 
They bring to mind the total quality movement, a 
movement that was global in an immense number of 
ways, a movement that grew global in an immense 
number of dimensions.   Geographic globalization 
was the least of these.  Total quality globalized the 
concept of globalization, extending it across a great 
variety of dimensions.   What is the suggestive 
connection between the patterns of complexity 
generat ion and reduct ion and tota l qual ity’s 
globalization of globalization?
Total quality, to be specifi c, greatly expanded 
the scope of what is facing complex situations.   It 
immensely changed the scope of what was facing 
challenges to attaining quality.   It totalized quality 
then globalized it in numerous ways.   The challenges 
to quality were never one sort of thing.   As each 
challenge to quality was handled, it merely opened up 
new vistas wherein new challenges to quality lay.   As 
each of those was handled, the same thing happened 
again.   Total quality expanded the scope of what 
was facing the unknown but still expanding scope of 
challenges to attaining quality.   Totalizing quality 
approaches updated approaches to attaining quality 
so as to match somewhat the scope of challenges to 
attaining quality.   Total quality is a case of society 
handling deeply and for a long time complexity of a 
specifi c yet general sort.  It may be very instructive 
to see if things other than quality, complexities other 
than challenges to quality attainment, given similar 
treatment produce similarly impressive results.  In 
other words, the possibility exists that totalizing 
attainment of quality amounted to complexifying 
attainment of quality to match complexity of 
challenges to that.   Hence, totalizing attainment of 
quality invented a tool kit for totalizing attainment 
of all sorts of other things hindered by rather similar 
amounts and types of complexity in the world. 
This paper explores this generalization possibility. 
What if the way one body of knowledge--quality 
knowledge--was totalized then globalized, if applied 
to goals other than quality, handled powerfully 
complexities of other sorts in the world, not all that 
different than complexities of quality attainment?
The Case of Quality Knowledge
Key to this investigation then is mapping out just 
exactly what was done to quality knowledge in the 
course of totalizing and globalizing it.   What forms 
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of complexity got handled in doing that, that were not 
seen and handled before when quality was handled 
for decades by the quality assurance profession. 
What other bodies of knowledge, not handled by 
specifi c professions, if totalized and globalized, 
might handle better their own specifi c forms of 
complexity?
The Ways that Quality Knowledge was Globalized 
(Social and Technical Forms of Each)
Below I present a model, from numerous surveys 
of total quality history of most of the dimensions by 
which the body of knowledge on quality was totalized 
then globalized and what forms of complexity each 
enabled handling in some way or other.   This is 
being done here so that we can examine totalization 
and globalization of quality knowledge as a possible 
toolkit that can be easily extended to handle similar 
forms of complexity cropping up in myriad other 
domains of knowledge.
The purpose of this work is to establish a correct 
historical model of how quality was globalized in 
various ways, abstract away everything from the 
quality focal point to get generalized operators that 
might be apply-able to other bodies of knowledge 
besides quality knowledge to vastly extend their 
capability of handling the complexities outlined 
earlier in this paper.  
Establishing the Fundamentals of Managing
Globalization 1 [movements formed]:  Movement 
of Movements--among business movement, 
installs within business movement, among 
supp l i er s - cus tomers  movement ,  in s ta l l s  
movemental parts of organization 
(Cole and Scott, 2000)
What Prof. Kano calls the “vehicle” dimension 
in totalizing quality is a set of social movement 
building tactics at its core.   Within particular 
companies quality was totalized by making entire 
workforces responsible for it where before only 
one profession--usually called “quality assurance” 
was responsible.   This involves spreading certain 
goals, methods, measures, rewards, and social 
supports across entire company workforces using 
social movement building tactics.   This also quickly 
involved spreading the same across “chains” of 
supplier and customer companies using the same 
tactics.   It also involved establishing as on-going 
parts of company structure continual self-change 
processes having social movement aspects.  Quickly 
this became spread of all of the above across all 
companies in par ticular industr ies, across all 
industries, and eventually across diverse sectors 
of society, till totalization of quality was a world 
wide movement in nearly all social institutions. 
These four movements are the fi rst totalization of 
quality--movement within fi rm, movement across 
chained fi rms, movement aspects installed, movement 
across single societies, movement across nations.  
Globalization 2 [stages of belief]: Disguise-Fad-Me
thod-Paradigm (Cole and Scott, 2000)
Within any one fi rm, chain, structure, sector 
of society, or the globe itself, stages of belief 
were encountered, usually in identical sequence. 
Totalization of quality was fi rst seen as a thin 
disguise around unfair Japanese competition.   There 
is nothing to it but disguise value in this view. 
People tried totalizing quality, an unnatural act, only 
because they were forced to by Japanese quality 
attainments penetrating their markets worldwide. 
People almost never tried it because of virtue, inner 
conviction, or a general desire to improve.   They 
tried it after Japanese competition either drove their 
own fi rm near extinction or drove one or more of 
their major competitors to the brink.  This “it’s 
disguise” phase gave way a “it’s a fad” stage.   Here 
fi rms denied any deep value to quality totalization 
and saw its movemental spread as sign of shallow 
fadism at its root.  It was seen as merely a crowd 
phenomenon in this stage.   This stage was followed 
by seeing totalization of quality as a particular 
method for addressing quality.   It took several years 
of seeing quality as disguise and fad before this stage 
was reached.   The method phase gave way later to 
a paradigm phase in which quality totalization was 
seen as a new way of viewing many things in the 
world besides quality.   All of business was redefi ned 
by it, in this view.  Indeed, in not a few places, 
higher education, government, careers, and more 
were revisioned in this phase.  These phases of belief 
and conviction were globalizations of quality from 
periphery of consciousness to core of consciousness.
Globalization 3 [control]:  War on Variation--
variation reduction, statistical common and special 
causes, 6 sigma 
(Cole and Scott, 2000; Shiba, 1993)
The original emphasis when quality was fi rst 
totalized, in ideas in the US (by Feigenbaum, 
Ju ran,  and Dem ing) and in act ion in Japan 
shortly after the Second World War, was war on 
variation.   Understanding variation was key at that 
time.  Feigenbaum elaborated this into a technical 
machinery for quality control, Deming into a 
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statistical machinery, and Juran into a management 
machinery.  Quality achievement and variation 
reduction were nearly synonymous in quality’s early 
days.   This was a refl ection of nothing profound 
about quality so much as something profound about 
industrial self control in general.  Quality “control” 
was not a lot different than profi t “control”, personnel 
“control”, market “control”.  The issue was any 
sort of getting to actual causes beyond the mask of 
blaming lower level people.  Quality totalization’s 
fi rst agenda item was teaching managers when and 
where to manage anything and what managing 
anything consisted of.   Quality totalization began 
with the issue of getting management to appear, after 
decades indeed centuries of playing at it.   Quality 
fi rst tackled getting management and workforces 
together to manage processes, any processes at all. 
Till they understood what managing consisted of, 
what it looked like, what it felt like, then they would 
“manage” any approach to quality as badly as they 
traditionally “managed” everything else.   Quality 
fi rst established a minimal form of management of 
some part of the enterprise.   The issue in warring on 
variation is not variation;  the issue is using variation 
to teach managements and workforces together what 
“managing” anything is.   
The original quality totalization of war on 
variation started simply with trying to reduce 
va r iat ion in process outputs that d ispleased 
customers.   A lot of obvious dumb things infested 
processes everywhere that made processes out of 
control.   If “in control” meant centered around a 
trait that customers valued, then “out of control” 
meant not hitting that trait very much, hence, 
greatly displeasing customers.   The next step was 
getting causal knowledge of what was causing the 
variation.   Here statistical knowledge was key 
because there were causes of variation inherent in 
how processes were designed and other causes not 
part of that, more incidental or “special” as they were 
called.   Distinguishing on statistical terms, common 
from special causes of variation characterized this 
stage.   Six sigma campaigns, a next step, simply 
applied more stringent measures of the variation to 
be allowed in process outcome traits and hence in 
intermediate causal process step traits.   Key to six 
sigma, though unfortunately omitted from a great 
many such campaigns, is invention by workforces 
of new measurement tools, allowing more precise 
measures and automatic basic statistical analysis 
and display.  These so-called “measures for six 
sigma”  or “measure automation” campaigns usually 
were parallel to, preparatory to, or folded in with 
six sigma ones.  These four steps--obvious causes, 
statistically distinguished causes, stringent measures, 
and measure invention and automation--represent 
discovering the contents of management.  In learning 
to fi nd and act on causes, in learning to collect and 
analyze data statistically in order to distinguish cause 
types, in order to reveal layer after layer of causes of 
variation, entire workforces and their managements 
learned a type of management directed at processes, 
so as to infl uence outputs of them that affected 
customers, and that was directed at causes, not top 
of the head intuitions about what bad employee 
had messed up something.   The overt agenda was 
controlling variation, the covert agenda was learning 
what “control” meant on a scientifi c fact-based basis 
instead of a “I am a higher authority than you are and 
anything I wish goes” basis.  Companies missing this 
covert agenda had funny little statistical programs all 
over with no or nearly no lasting results.  
Globalization 4 [promoting customers]:  Customer 
Orientation--customer pull, customer responsive 
org, quality is what the customer says it is 
(Oliver, 1997; Hayes, 1992; Greene, Gathering 
Customer Requirements, 1998; Greene, Establishing 
Customer Requirements, 1999)
As causal analyses by one group then another 
built up over time, many of the same causes began 
to appear.  It was apparent to all that everything 
in the entire organization, every last bit of culture, 
training, incentives, habits, traditions, viewpoints, 
and the like, pulled everyone away from attention to 
customers and instead upward towards bosses.   The 
dynamics of making a career in the view of powerful 
bosses completely extinguished any room for, interest 
in, or attention to customers.   In organization after 
organization, all attention was upward, none was 
horizontal, along processes to customers of their 
outputs.  Quality, already totalized and with belief 
globalized, expanded towards customers.   Every 
bit of each organization was reseen, reconnected, 
remeasu red as  to  i t s  impact  on  customers.  
Everything that got people looking up instead of 
looking left and right was suspect, examined, and 
revised.   
The fi rst stage of this was the customer pull 
stage of kanban cards bicycled to nearby suppliers 
as automatic ways to re-order re-invoice inventory 
just-in-time at exactly when needed.  This was 
followed by a customer responsive organization stage 
of defi ning management’s primary task as removing 
blocks in the organization that prevented employees 
from serving customers better.   The next stage was a 
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revision of defi nitions of quality, sloughing all sorts 
of technocratic ones of past pre-totalized quality 
efforts, and replacing them with “quality is what the 
customer says it is” for only that defi nition removes 
arguments with customers about it, arguments 
which companies always ultimately lose.  The fourth 
stage of this was interiorizing customers inside 
company systems, including them in social systems 
for customers, co-designing with them, and the 
like.   Turning customers into managers, of the old 
authoritative sort and of the new statistically directed 
at causes sort, was what all these stages ultimately 
were about.   From the arbitrary power of men in 
hierarchies, to the arbitrary power of what customers 
say they want--customers are the new managers in 
this globalization type.   
The Cost-Benefi ts
Globalization 5 [interiorize]:  Evolving Fitness--
standard, use, cost, latent requirements 
(Bergman and Klefsjo, 1994; Shiba, 1993)
Concepts of what a “fi t” product was changed 
along with the above changes.   From conformance 
to standards of the fi rm or industry, to fi t for uses 
that customers put products to, to fi t cost, to meeting 
unexpressed latent requirements in customers, the 
fi tness idea evolved.   The trend here was clearly from 
articulate to inarticulate, from formal to intimate, 
from objective to inside the mind.   Here quality was 
globalized towards deep interiority of defi nition, 
gett ing inside the mind more than customers 
themselves could to defi ne it.   
Globalization 6 [self funding]:  Self Financing--
free quality,  self  funding, cost of quality,  
multi-satisfaction dimensional costs 
(Greene, 1993; Rust et al, 1994)
Concepts of the costs of getting quality evolved 
along with the above changes as well.  Quality was 
free to achieve, at fi rst, because examination of 
processes that it entailed nearly always found wastes, 
the elimination of which more than paid for changes 
in such processes needed to improve quality (reduce 
variation).   Quality was later seen as self funding 
because of the impact that improving it had on sales, 
re-purchases, upgrades, profi ts, and future revenue 
streams to the company.   The costs of quality were 
more than covered by increased customer retention, 
purchase, and upgrades.   Later still quality’s cost 
became an actual object of research, looking at the 
cost of failing your own quality standards, the cost of 
having low standards, and the cost of opportunities 
lost because of poor quality.   Finally, the cost of 
quality was measured by multi-dimensional models 
of the twenty separate dimensions of any product 
or service that satisfi ed customers or not, with 
costs of poor quality calculated for each.   This was 
globalization of quality as globalizing calculations of 
its costs (and benefi ts).   
Globalization 7 [ergonomics]:  Human-scale 
systems--failsafi ng, TPM total preventative 
maintenance, study-action cycle, line-centered 
organization ideal 
(Greene, 1993; Shiba, 1993; Cole and Scott, 2000)
What dangerously gets lost in cultures that 
a re h iera rch ica l ,  techn ica l,  cognit ive is  the 
ordinary worker human scale of things.   As a 
result totally unattainable unrealistic goals fi lter 
down to tens of thousands of people who take the 
ridiculousness of their orders as a measure of how 
utterly contemptuous of them management and 
leaders are and how utterly out of touch with reality 
technical and systems people are.   Here, systems 
are globalized to incorporate more and more of the 
actual constraints and capabilities of the majority of 
people actually doing/implementing things.  
Globalization 8 [optimize]:  Minimax--minimizing 
loss to customers, maximize signal to noise ratio, 
optimize ideal energy fl ow, optimize line not point 
values 
(Phaedke, 1989; Taguchi, 1986; Greene, 1993) 
This global izat ion of the qual ity body of 
knowledge extends optimization towards systems 
and root causes away from visible symptomatic 
performances.  Optimization work drifts inevitably 
it seems towards the easy to see and easy to fi x, and 
away from the deep systematic highly distributed 
causes that work most powerfully to control myriad 
outcomes.   This globalization reverses that drift, 
forcing optimization more and more towards 
profound system-wide deep causes and away from 
mere symptoms.   Some readers will recognize 
Genichi Taguchi’s work here (commonly mistaken for 
typical design of experiments work by technocratic 
US experts).  
Making Essentials Visible
Globalization 9 [clear waste]:  Waste Reduction--
low hanging fruit,  buddhist trance of “no 
obstruction”, eliminate creativity noise of career 
system 
(Greene, 1993; Akao, 1990)
Here, defi nitions of waste are globalized from 
the easy obvious kinds of things that anybody knows 
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about, to an almost aesthetic of clear line purity and 
open mind clear heart buddhist trance to market. 
The defi nition of waste is radicalized towards mental 
and emotive components beyond physical sorts of 
things.   This is the counterpart to Taguchi-style 
optimization of ideal energy fl ows in globalization 8 
above.  
Globalization 10 [science]:  Democratizing the 
Scientifi c Method--managing by fact, quality 
circles, 7 statistical tools, 7 management tools 
(standardized tool sets)--
(Ozeki and Asaka, 1990)
Sequential whole unit of competition deployment 
of one new tool set after another, each accompanied 
by specifi c application procedures for improving 
work in specifi c directions, gradually installs the 
full scientifi c research method that Ph.D. students 
at places like MIT learn.  This actually progresses 
t i l l 1200 or more workgroups a year in some 
Japanese companies develop multi-variate statistical 
defi nitions of what the problem is, similar treatments 
of what the cause is, similar of what the solution 
that works is, similar of what the way to implement 
widely that solution is, and similar of what the total 
effects of all this are.   Nothing similar in any US 
or European workforce has ever been documented. 
Distributing the scientifi c method, incrementally 
this way, turns blue collar workers into Ph.d.-like 
researchers of their own work processes, vastly 
increasing the educational level of entire workforces 
and forming a hard resilient block to ignorant 
managers and their efforts to manage by intimidation 
or rank or opinion or gut feel.  This particular 
globalization of the quality body of knowledge 
installs the full scientifi c method of research to 
replace management by intimidation, rank, and 
opinion.  It equips workforces to survey and stop 
inept or lazy manager regimes.  Workgroups start 
proving with valid data, again and again, that manager 
whim and authority are poor substitutes for fi nding 
causes using valid research tools.  Given the culture 
of most US MBA programs you could also call this 
a “barrier to MBA ideology” embedded in entire 
workforces, by increment.  
Globalization 11 [remove hiding places]:  
Debuffering Processes--tolerance inventory, 
physical inventory, idea inventory 
(Greene, 1993; Taguchi, 1986; Gaucher and Coffey, 
1993)
Here attainment of quality is hindered by 
large inventories, used as hiding places for poorly 
designed and executed processes.   One by one such 
inventories are found and eliminated here to expose 
actual status of process execution.   The idea in this 
globalization is more and more exposure via more 
and more removal of hiding places for poor design 
and execution of processes.  
Globalization 12:  Process Engineering--architecture,
modeling, re-engineering, virtualization
(Olson et al, 2001; Greene, 1993)
When hiding places are stripped bare and the 
actual state of processes is evident to all, then basic 
improvement can be applied to processes, including 
in the beginning, getting the architecture of what 
processes exist and what other process any one 
process relates to made clear and stripped of waste 
processes and processing.   Here what processes 
are needed and how processes are delivered are 
rationalized, stripped of waste, and optimized.  
Organizational Inclusion
Globalization 13 [cover]:  Social Leveling--big 
and small quality, more numbers to manage to, 
workforce mobilization excuse, personal quality 
(Roberts, 1995)
Get t ing ent i re organ izat ions involved in 
attainment of any goal is a type of globalization of 
goal attainment.   At fi rst total quality lives alongside 
quality assurance.   Eventually the old relics dwindle 
away, replaced fully by statistical tools.   At fi rst 
quality is just a different set of numbers to manage 
to, for career boosts, but that dwindles away, replaced 
by quality as the only path for career success (mastery 
of quality tools required for promotions as one 
gets higher up in hierarchies).  Similarly, quality 
at fi rst serves as a kind of excuse to mobilize and 
empower parts of workforces subservient under male 
hierarchy regimes.   It is an excuse for empowerment. 
This gets replaced by quality as genuine way to 
increase everyone’s power by making everything 
address actual causes instead of authority fi gure 
personal opinions and impressions.  Similarly, it 
becomes an empowerment excuse for individuals 
who reconfi gure and retool themselves with quality 
goals and methods.   In this way the quality goal 
gets globalized to cover all scales and scopes of the 
workplace.   
Globalization 14:  Border Dissolution--moving 
borders, boundarylessness, systems distribution of 
causes and solutions 
(Cole and Scott, 2000; Greene, 1993) 
The departmental hierarchy that bureaucratic 
organization form creates makes people not see 
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across borders, not dream across them, not measure 
across them, and not take responsibility across them. 
Getting everyone in an organization to see, measure, 
and work towards ultimate results that impact 
customers and markets requires dissolving borders in 
various ways and systems, both social and technical. 
This globalization achieves this dissolution in stages, 
fi rst by extending borders, then by outright dissolving 
of them (making processes primary), then by 
distributing thinking, solving, implementing across 
entire processes rather than keeping thought tightly 
bound up in small narrow departments.   
Globalization 15:  Market Interiorization--refl ective
work, job plurifi cation, maintenance/kaizen/leap 
management, market relations into fi rm as next step 
my customer 
(Shiba, 1993; Greene, 1993)
When each function or department next to me 
is my customer, when work inside organizations 
is put up for bid and given to the team making the 
best bid, when people are invited to volunteer for 
and do as many different jobs as they have ambition 
and cleverness for each week, then more and more 
functions are being market-ized.  Globalizing via 
taking the bureaucracy out of doing functions and 
putting those functions up for market based bids 
brings the core of the capitalist economy--competiti
on--into execution of functions.   It extends the core 
of the economy to deep inside of fi rms.   It reduces 
confl ict and complexity where bureau meets market.  
Globalization 16:  De-verticalization--horizontal 
management, de-turfi ng, de-professionalizing a 
body of knowledge (quality)--
(Cole et al, 2004; Greene, 1993)
The problem is empires.  If I structure everything 
as departments, they become empires used to propel 
the careers of a few at the expense of the careers of 
many.  If I structure everything as processes, they 
become empires used the same way.  If I structure 
everything as events, they become empires used the 
same way.   So what has to be done is transitioning 
from one structure type to a better faster more 
fl exible one while also blocking and removing empire 
elements that people try to build up within each new 
structure type.  The problem is also professions. 
Whether or not empires are being built, new areas 
get professionalized, eventually to the point that only 
specially anointed people are “qualifi ed” to work in 
them, followed by a host of other more or less entirely 
self-serving restrictions of the budding professionals. 
This adds another needed element--blocks to and 
removing of professionalization elements in new 
structure areas.   Globalizing a body of knowledge 
here means successively blocking human empire, 
profession, and similar tendencies.   
Transparency
Globalization 17:  Diversity Focus--aligning 
human magnets, use entire workforce mindpower, 
line-centered organization systems 
(Kawase, 1990; Greene, 1993)
CEOs like to talk about alignment, perhaps using 
it as a euphemism for “do what I say, not what you 
say”.  Alignment, however, is not one thing done one 
way at one time.  It is a campaign, over many years, 
with new methods deployed and new more stringent 
and psychically deep measures of it deployed along 
the way.   In short, it is a globalization of a body 
of knowledge in the direction of getting complex 
multifarious organizations or sets of same to pull 
in the same direction.   It starts with overt obvious 
measures of alignment sharing and evolves to 
deploying all the diverse talents and capabilities of 
entire workforces in single directions, then evolving 
to an ideal of managementless workforces, with no 
cost-only functions like management, headquarters, 
advertising departments and other pure forms of 
overhead cost.   It evolves, in short, from getting 
all to pull in the same direction to getting rid of 
functions not adding value in that one direction.   
Globalization 18:  Basic functions 
(Bergman and Lkefsjo, 1994; Greene, Managing 
Complex Systems, 2002)
Too many globalizations and fundamentals begin 
to slip between the cracks.  However, successive 
globalizations leave behind a residue of insight about 
just what functions are fundamental and what are 
not.  It is the combination of these two that results 
in this globalization, a sort of “back to basics” one 
of successively installing very fi ne versions of each 
key process below.   What is vital is balance among 
each pair, that is, each step in listening to customers 
matched with a step in surveying new process 
capabilities out there in the world somewhere that 
could be installed to supply what customers, newly 
listened to, are found to want, and so on.
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Globalization 19:  Visualization--visual self 
management (control points, manage by signal), 
iceberg inarticulate 2/3s, quality cognitive 
architecture
(Greene, Managing Complex Systems, 2002; 
Brudney e al, 2000)
An art critic from an alien world, arriving by 
spaceship, in the midst of some company would 
notice that what is important to the local people there 
is not evident in what is visually evident there.   That 
is the most visible things are no indications of the 
most important things.  This gap between what is 
visually evident everywhere and what is of prime 
importance everywhere has large scale and important 
consequences.   It produces stupendous errors, rarely, 
and myriads of smaller ones every day.  There are 
many size scales to this--what is visually evident in 
some manufacturing line, whether all processes are 
visually unifi ed and identifi able though parts of them 
are done in separate facilities, whether emotive and 
inarticulate requirements everywhere are visually 
evident, whether walls, ceilings, cabinets, boards 
make visually evident what is most important.   This 
globalization amounts to extending across facilities 
from small size to large size, unifying themes across 
diverse facilities, till all that is most important is 
what is also most visually evident in each facility.   
Globalization 20:  Transparency to Voices--of 
process, of president, of customer, of supplier 
(Akao, 1990)
There are four fundamental directions, up, down, 
left, and right, and organizations have them as well as 
individual persons.   This globalization is extending 
through all four of such directions transmission 
without distortion of all the clients of each direction 
require.  This means getting what customers require, 
suppliers require, presidents and investors require, 
and lower in hierarchy employees require well 
transmitted.
Capability Inventions
Globalization 21:  Social Cleavage Mobilization--
whole workforce research system, socially virtual 
fi rms, leadership cohort shifts 
(Greene, 1993) 
T here  i s  a  lo t  of  d iver sit y  wit h in  la rge  
organizations though one would never know it 
from the way leaders ignore it all or dislike it 
where it raises its head.   Truth is, few know what 
to do with diversity.   This globalization happens 
when and where people do know what to do with 
it.  If you assign research roles to every workgroup, 
say for example, on Fridays of each week; if you 
assign people two jobs, one from Monday through 
Thursday every week and the other, in an entirely 
different fi rm, that exists only on Fridays; if we 
take all the managers away from one product 
development project and replace them all with people 
20 years older, or all females--if we do these sorts 
of things we use social cleavage types of diversity 
in the workforce.   It is one thing to have forms of 
diversity, it is quite another to actually put them to 
constructive use.   This particular globalization of a 
body of knowledge involves successive such uses of 
successive such types of social cleavage diversity in 
a workforce.   It globalizes what diversity is use and 

























R. T. Greene,    Generalized Quality
Globalization 22:  New Competency Inventions--
library of reliable technologies, general science of 
improvement, cycle time reduction, co-design with 
customers
(Phaedke, 1989; Taguchi, 1986; Greene, 1993)
People tend to create product development 
projects that mostly do not develop products 
but handle reliability problems when they use 
un-proven new technologies.   We call them “product 
development projects” but they more rightly should 
be called “reliability fi xing projects” for that is 
what occupies everyone’s time and care.  When, 
instead, fi rms develop technologies with one stream 
of projects and products with a coordinated but 
distinct stream of them, wonderful things happen 
for product development projects have reliable new 
technologies instead of unproven ones to use.   There 
is a tendency for myriad problems to get defi ned 
by hundreds of workgroups across decades with no 
general survey and summary, synthesis and model, 
produced.   That is large organizations tend to not 
learn what they know--distributed separate learnings 
stay separate and unavailable.   If, instead, myriad 
workgroups all learned what all workgroups learned 
about improvement through decades of individual 
workgroup projects, then immense improvement 
might result.   In other words, an organizational 
learning project focussed on getting learning by 
each workgroup that improved some process made 
available, suitably summarized and synthesized, 
to all current and future workgroups, offers much 
improvement in improvement efforts.  Now consider 
cycle times for getting things done of various sorts 
and techniques for reducing such times.   Consider 
also links to customers that allow them to input when 
new products or customer needs are being considered. 
These are but four of millions of new capabilities 
fi rms can develop as new customer requirements 
reveal a need for them.   This globalization is simply 
expansion of a fi rm’s library of capabilities.  
Globalization 23:  Cognitive Depth--deployment 
of sets of 5 questions, cognitive competitiveness, 
quality of cognitive functions like reading, writing, 
speaking, feeling production
(Roberts, 1995; Gaucher and Coffey, 1993; Greene, 
1993)
The quality of cognition in an organization is 
usually adjusted by a long stream of new themes 
in hiring, taking decades to show major effects. 
However, if in the past, sets of standardized tool sets 
(7 statistical tools, 7 management tools, 7 simulation 
tools, 7 work coordination tools and the like) have 
been deployed, one after another, across varied 
topography of one or several related workforces, 
then similar tools for improving power of various 
cognitive operations in the mind becomes feasible 
and even natural, non-controversial.   This can start 
simply with deploying questions to answer, measures 
of cognitive power of self versus competitor fi rms, 
measures of quality of various cognitive activities 
used daily and hourly, and so on.   Globalizing from 
easy tools for cognitive competitiveness achievement 
to advanced challenging tools, is another important 
globalization of any body of knowledge.   
Globalization 24:  New Bases of Competing--
competing thru mundainities, new unit the cross-
unit replacing corporations, SWAT authority 
systems
(Frederickson and Johnston, 1999; Ashworth, 1995; 
Greene, 1993; Cole et al, 2004)
There is the matter of inventing entirely new 
types of capability.  This requires real imagination 
and creativity.   This form of globalizing a body 
of knowledge works it into extremely fundamental 
categories of existence.   Mundane most activities are 
embedded with the body of knowledge, coalitions of 
organizations are structured around application of 
the body of knowledge, instantly assembled teams for 
newly defi ned tasks are assembled around it, and so 
forth.   SWAT authority means that instead of fi xed 
amounts of authority in a system, this allows fl uid 
amounts of authority, the total being some function of 
the total scope and number of teams commissioned 
at any one time.  In short this globalization embeds 
the body of knowledge in diverse fundamental 
parts of the world.  Knowledge has to be embedded 
somewhere if it is to be effi cacious.   
Knowledge Deployments
Globalization 25:  Re-engineering--changing 
functions about what functions to do, changing 
functions about how to do functions, changing 
social materials for doing functions, changing 
technical materials for doing functions, aligning 
social and technical materials into platforms
(Greene, Managing Complex Systems, 2002; 
Roberts, 1995)
Re-engineering, downsizing, and total quality 
all apply the same quality body of knowledge: 
total quality to defi ne what is essential with it, 
downsizing to eliminate the non-essential with it, 
and re-engineering to do the essential functions with 
updated assumptions and social/technical materials 
now available.   Re-engineering simply globalizes by 
updating substrates for doing work functions, from 
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time to time, whenever the outside world burps up 
new relevant capabilities.  
 
Globalization 26:  Liquefaction of Structure--
deploy processes across supply and customer 
chains, dissolving organizations in common 
infrastructures via outsourcing, automating 
process deployment across organizations, replace 
departments with processes and processes with 
events
(Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; Cole and Scott, 2000; 
Greene, 1993)
One of the most profound globalizations of any 
body of knowledge is this--liquefaction.   It is a 
kind of melting--stiff rigid things become fl uid and 
fl ow.   Flowing things lose viscosity and fl ow faster 
and smoother.   At fi rst processes are made to melt 
across entire chains of workforces better and better. 
Next organization components melt into outsourcing 
contracts by better, cheaper suppliers than internal 
bureaus.   After that the regular deployment 
of processes gets automated, using sof tware 
and face-to -face mass workshop events.   This 
globalization culminates in dissolution of structures 
into processes and of processes into events.  Every 
function that can be done by something faster and 
more fl exible gets done by it.  
Globalization 27:  Learning Leverage--org 
learning and knowledge depositories, emotive 
rationality, high performance, create world best 
customer taste
(Vaill, 1989; Brown and Duguid, 2002; Greene, 
1993)
A certain intensity to learning produces high 
performance of various sorts, depending of the 
sort of learning thusly intensifi ed.  This can start 
as getting teams to deposit, some standard way and 
place, what they learn after projects.   It can grow 
into new rationalities infused with the logic of 
emotions that allow fuller representation of needs 
and wishes, desires and satisfactions to fl ow through 
ever more transparent systems.  It can result in 
high performance teams, alliances, and chains of 
organizations.  It can result in customers teaching 
themselves to be world leaders in taste.  Intense 
learning, deployed from teams to depositories, 
deploying emotive rationality throughout company 
systems, deploying high performance among 
teams, deploying world best taste achievement 
among customers, is a further way to globalize any 
particular body of knowledge.  
Globalization 28:  Organization as Theory--the 
corporat ion  as  exper iment ,  products  as  
experiments, ventures as experiments, just-in-time 
creation of corporations, game-simulation-groupw
are continuum, agile manufacturing
(Greene, Social Cellular Automata Process, 1997; 
Greene, 1993)
Creativity can be liquefi ed as well.   If things 
structured as bureaus instead get structured as 
provisional arrangements that produce data to 
validate their utility or suggest ways to restructure 
them, then organization becomes experiment. 
This in effect liquefi es structures.  It is not only 
organizat ions that can be thusly turned into 
experimental forms.  Products, venture businesses, 
and others can be handled thusly.   This eventually 
becomes systems that automatically suggest, recruit, 
and form corporations when new constellations of 
customer needs or process capabilities are detected 
across electronic networks.   This, in turn, can result 
in entire economies, more liquid, in that they dissolve 
into immense repertoires of outsource suppliers 
of myriad services that can be nearly instantly 
confi gured into entire corporations for periods of 
time that then dissolve back into repertoire from. 
This is globalizing a body of knowledge via turning 
fi xed forms in it into experimental forms to be 
validated or revised by the data they produce.  They 
are structured as data collection means.  
Diversifi cation
Globalization 29:  Diversifying Diversity--stages of 
culture penetration, stratifying responses, culture 
characterization dimensions
(Greene, Leveraging Diversity, 2000; Greene, 1993)
There are lots of diverse types of diversity in 
large multi-national organizations.   However, till 
we have a way to measure and model that diversity 
within any one type of diversity, it comes to us fairly 
simple and un-diverse.   In other words, though 
we may know it is there, without a way of making 
specifi c, naming, and differentiating the diversity 
of features within any one diverse dimension of 
something, that diversity is not apparent, there, 
to be remarked and acted upon.   Indeed, without 
naming it may not even be noticed.  Since much of 
the reaction to dimensions of diversity is emotive, 
many people may be unaware of their own responses 
or of the responses of others.  Tools that elucidate, 
differentiate, qualify, and quantify diverse features of 
any one diversity type encountered, make the world 
larger, bringing more of it into awareness, action, and 
infl uence.   This globalization is achieved by fi nding 
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or devising, then deploying a stream of such tools, 
that, in turn, produce streams of new features visible 
and infl uenceable in the world.   
Global izat ion 30:   Management Del ivery 
Alternatives--manage by balancing, manage by 
events, manage by building movements
(Greene, the Selection Automaton Model, 1999; 
Greene, 1993)
So many tools, results, changes, impacts, profi ts, 
alternatives, inventions accumulate via the above 
listed actions in globalizing a body of knowledge 
that what, before all of that, was called “managing” 
begins to look lamer and lamer, and eventually, 
totally inadequate for any purpose.   In other words, 
the cumulative result of the previously described 
(above) globalizations, is the defi ning of an entirely 
new defi nition of managing.  From the viewpoint 
of that new defi nition, existing “managers” rarely if 
ever manage anything and what they do and now call 
“managing” largely fails to execute any of the basic 
functions of managing.   Indeed, having managing 
functions delivered by a fi xed inventory of people, a 
social class, called “managers” with better parking 
and clothes and perks than other employees, has 
dual costs of needed managing functions going 
undone and unneeded ones getting done to fi ll 
time and “look” managerial.  The question, then, 
arises--what other ways are there for delivering 
various management functions?  Nearly all the 
intuitions, insights, and gut feelings of existing 
managers can be plotted out on highly abstract 
dimensional models of workplace dynamics (of 
psychic, social, anthropological, economic, political 
and other sorts).  Managers from experience build up 
such models in their minds, whether fully conscious 
or not, and use them to spot imbalances among 
such dynamics.  Correcting such imbalances is 
then something such managers suggest, astonishing 
others, not having their experience, with their 
insightfulness or intuitive powers.   Hidden means 
turns judgements into magic performances.  This 
can evolve into delivering managing functions, not 
by abstract imbalance models, but by events, mass 
workshop events, wherein world best protocols for 
doing some function are done by dozens of people 
working in parallel workshops.  This can evolve into 
delivering managing functions by social movements 
deployed over complex assemblages of companies, 
processes, or workgroups.   This is globalization of a 
body of knowledge via extending means of delivering 
management of the dynamics implied by that body of 
knowledge.   
Globalization 31:  Software Quality--root 
cause specifi cation of systems, tandem of social 
with software feature, group programming, 
programming markets
(Greene, 1993; Greene, General Empirical
 Computation, 1998)
Software is not one new technology but a whole 
host of new technologies.  It is a new intelligent 
medium, alongside human brains, in the universe. 
Therefore, economies, managers, and fi rms have 
been slow to fi gure out just what to do with it.  Many 
fi rms, for example, were surprised to suddenly one 
day fi nd they were primarily creating software 
not hardware.  They were led and structured as if 
they were hardware fi rms but all the value add that 
customers benefi tted from came from the software 
they created.   Thus, software is a new medium 
of intelligence, not merely a new technology.   It 
delivers hosts of new software technologies, one after 
the other, to the world.   Given this scope to software, 
it is key to direct it at workplace root causes, to 
team it up with social tactics rather than stupidly 
thinking that technology alone gets things done, to 
apply all the globalizations above to how software 
gets produced.   This globalization of bodies of 
knowledge involves doing to software all that the 
above globalizations did to quality.   Thusly software, 
unique among all the globalizations presented here, 
introduces the idea that all the globalizations done to 
quality could also be done to entirely other goals and 
means of work.  
Globalization 32:  Movement Globalization--unite 
10 quality related movements, value meshing 
practices
(Greene, Social Cellular Automata Process, 1997; 
Greene, Evolutionary Engineering, 1996; Greene, 
Quality Globalization, 2000)
Software, however, is not the only breakthrough 
item in this list of globalizations of bodies of 
knowledge.   Movement Globalization involves 
extending this entire sequence of globalizations 
to a sequence of related but different other values 
or means in the world.   For example the global 
environment movement, pursuing quality of the 
earth, can use the entire apparatus of quality and 
quality globalizations presented above, to further 
its aims by enabling it to better handle complexity, 
such as those sources of complexity that started this 
article.   However, that example extends quality to 
other movements towards other forms of quality.  We 
are not limited to forms of quality.  We can pursue 
software for example, or democratization, or internet 
forms of doing business, or venture clusters.  Where 
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plural such globalizations intersect value meshing 
practices can be invented that allow multiple 
objectives of multiple globalization efforts to be 
simultaneously fulfi lled.  This is the most global of 
the globalizations listed here.  
Biologic Commonsense
Globalization 33:  Non-linear Management--
emergence replacing design,  evolutionary
engineering, manage by tuning interacting 
population units
(Greene, What Complexity Theory Can Contribute, 
1997; Greene, Evolutionary Engineering, 1996; 
Greene, A Garbage Can Model of Creativity, 2001)
The directness of powerful males naming an 
objective and arranging resources till it is achieved 
satisfi es many people now and is demanded by most 
now as a way of work.   However, it is being replaced, 
more and more, by an indirect approach, common to 
females, of intimating an objective area and setting 
up interaction populations of units from the tuning 
of the interactions of which better-than-wanted 
results eventually emerge.  Spotting that emergence 
amid much intermixed noise is a primary skill of 
management in this regime.   Similarly, management 
can be extended to changing design and decision to 
handle better systems that self consciously evolve. 
Our traditions of managing are mechanical, based 
on fi xed mechanical means interacting in predictable 
ways to produce fully imagined results.   Whenever, 
however, it is not inanimate physical products that 
are being designed or managed, such habits of work 
deform results or fail to obtain good ones entirely. 
Special design and leadership regimes, tailored to 
handle systems that self consciously evolve, that is, 
that react to being designed in unpredictable ways, 
changing the rules of the game in mid-game, can be 
devised.   This way to globalize bodies of knowledge 
adjusts them for being managed in these more 
biologic ways.  
Globalization 34:  Invention Quality--knowledge 
management, cognition platform upgrades, 
creativity platforms, creativity automation
(Greene, Selection Automaton Model of Creativity, 
1999; Greene, A Garbage Can Model of Creativity, 
2001)
Creativity eventually becomes a target of 
globalizations.   We can globalize any body of 
knowledge by extending support for creativity with 
that and in that body of knowledge.   How can 
creativity thusly be extended?  First, the production 
and use of knowledge can be managed, in biologic 
ways.   Second, tools for types of cognition that 
entire workforces use, can be invented, deployed, 
implemented, measured, and improved.   Third, such 
tool sets as platforms of cognitive performance can 
be upgraded regularly or as competitor developments 
indicate.   Fourth, constellations of social and 
technical tools can be confi gured especially in 
support of particular models of creating or steps 
in creating processes.   Fifth, tools can automate 
steps in creating.   These are ways to globalize 
achievement of creativity with any particular body of 
knowledge.  
Globalization 35:  Biologic Management--social 
a u t o m a t a  l e a d e r s h i p ,  m i c r o  i n s t i t u t i o n  
development, viral growth, open systems Linux
(Greene, Social Cellular Automata Process, 1997; 
Greene, Quality Globalization, 2000)
A second layer of biologic can infl uence 
management, giving rise to social versions of cellular 
automata software, and micro forms of institution 
that grow the way viruses grow, till entire nations 
are covered, and open systems volunteer consortia, 
like the Open Software Foundation, that elicit public 
competitive donations for the reward of respect and 
repute.   This is globalization of a body of knowledge 
by making management of that knowledge more 
biologic.   
Globalization 36:  Social & Technical Virtualizati
on--department/process/event virtualization, game
-simulation-groupware continuum, computational 
sociality, social virtuality, software sociality
(Greene, General Empirical Computation, 1998; 
Greene, Quality Globalization, 2000)
The fi nal globalization replaces face-to-face 
systems with elect ron ic network ones,  with 
departments, processes, and events done across 
networks, not necessarily simultaneously, allowing 
organizations that exist only 4 hours a week spread 
across the entire global with volunteers or market 
bidders as workforces that change daily, for one 
example.   Similarly games can be devised that grow 
into simulations of real systems that evolve into 
actual work coordination software that does real 
work.   This allows new ideas to be tried out in game 
form, perfected in simulation form, then deployed 
for actual work in work coordination software form. 
Social virtualization exists too.  It involves, for 
example, socially virtual fi rms, that exist only 4 hours 
a week, the entire fi rm’s work done as a hobby by a 
group of people.   Social connectionism and software 
socialities (object oriented, neural net, genetic 
algorithm forms of organizing people) are also 
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included in this.   Here ways things are done among 
software objects in computers inspire new ways for 
people to socially do things.  This virtualization type 
of globalization, globalizes bodies of knowledge by 
implementing, developing, and applying them in the 
virtual software world where things geographically 
impossible can easily be done at low costs with more 
complicated arrangements automatically coordinated 
by software and net events.
1. movement of movements
2. stages of belief















18. basic functions installed
19. invisibles made visible
20. transparency to voices
21. diversity leveraging
22. invent new 
competencies
23. cognitive depth
24. new basic unit of 
competing
• actor scale expansion
• volunteers elicited per topic
• standardization of tools across hugeÅ@scope
• time scale of commitment expansion
• management invented via cause focus
• opening to external environment
• career caused narcissism weakened
• frontier for future exterior understanding created
• side-effect benefits financially counted & budgeted
• re-centering around human not system scale
• systems optimized not single roles, functions, 
persons
• self control boundaries and disciplines established
• data replaces opinion based decision
• public space created for word and deed sharing of 
genba (workforce)
• inventories removed as hiding places for process 
slop
• find inter-process links, dependencies, enablements
• distinguish work from enabling processes from 
enablement means change processes
• automate process deployment
• particularize tactics for different social levels
• quantify and remove relictual structure blocks for 
flows
• bring market dynamics to interior structure 
components and their relations
• focus careers on impacting exterior customers not 
bosses
• get all internal units pointing in common direction
• fractally implement most fundamental management 
functions
• measure latent, interior, emotive components of 
impact
• omni-directional undistorted transmission of 
requirements
• pass diverse parties thru deployed processes, 
expand scope of doer
• systematic development of capabilities shared 
across the organization
• mental productivity expanded to scale of problems 
faced
• scale of unit that competes expanded to fit scale of 
problems faced
expansion of scale of doer to match scale of 
problem/opportunity
expansion of time scale of doer to match scale of 
problem/opportunity
recurrence of problems type complexity eliminated 
by addressing causes
exterior environment addressed rather than left 
unseen disrupting chaotically plans and career 
ambitions
scale of ambition expanded
side-effect benefits quantified
ergonomic reduction of system complexity of 
operation
inter-actions inter-relations optimized reducing chaos 
from non-combining individual excellences
self management to reduce chaos of own self 
established as basis for later system management
complexity from impression-based deciding replaced 
by valid data basis;
complexity of frustrated need to perform before 
others reduced by regular opportunity to perform
hidden complexity exposed by removal of traditional 
hiding places
complexity of actual inter-process architecture laid 
bare and reduced
complexity of inconsistency among social levels 
reduced by tailored approaches for each level
complex of structural excuses and traditions for poor 
process flows laid bare and removed
use overt measurable complexity of market bidding 
systems to do things rather than endure hidden 
complexity from bureaucracies
adjust flow of human ambitions to match systems 
newly redesigned for horizontal impacts
reduce variation of direction among org units
establish uniformity (non-complexity) by level of 
implementation of fundamental management 
functions
get systems to embrace emotive, subtle, nascent 
signals easily missed by formal, overt, rational 
systems--reduce complexity from missed non-
rational dimensions operating unseen
reduce complexity of inconsistent transmission of 
messages in upward, downward, leftward, and 
rightward directions 
using complexity there in diverse parts of 
organization as input thru uniformly distributed 
processes and events to produce creative outcomes
match customer requirements laid bare with 
development of new capabilities to reduce imbalance 
between new demands and ability to supply
using complexity there in diverse parts of human 
cognition via deploying uniform mental processes 
across varied workforce
expand scale of doer to match scale of problem
THE RESULT:  A MODEL APPLY-ABLE TO ANY BODY OF
KNOWLEDGE TO HANDLE COMPLEXITY
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Other Bodies of Knowledge to be Globalized 
Next--a Defi nition of Leadership
All the above globalizations have actually 
occurred and been experienced in the realm of 30 
years of total quality movement work in businesses 
(and some governments and universities).  They 
represent an ent i rely tested, la rgely proven, 
large-scale, global, practical approach that entire 
workforces and chains of companies are capable of 
mastering and applying in reasonable time periods 
at affordable costs.   They are ideas but also tested 
proven ideas.   They were all applied to one body of 
knowledge--quality knowledge--and used to expand, 
that is, globalize, it.  Each of the above 36 globalizes 
quality attainment in distinct ways.   The question is, 
what body of knowledge, other than quality, might 
next best benefi t from similar globalizations?  
To answer that it helps to review why quality as 
a body of knowledge was fi rst chosen for totalization 
and then the above globalizations.   Japan was 
receptive, after World War II, to learning from 
Americans, including Feigenbaum, Juran, and even 
Deming.  There was an immense need in Japan 
for quality improvement.  Japan took total quality 
tools and ideas from Americans and used them to 
make changes in Japanese culture of work--fi xing 
excess personalism, excess emotionality, and 
excess hierarchy that Americans did not suffer as 
much from.   Twenty years later, well standardized, 
documented, and entooled quality methods, applied 
by hundreds of companies in Japan, helped Japanese 
fi rms invade foreign markets worldwide, terrifying 
their competition.   It was terror of this sudden 
onslaught of Japanese competition that motivated 
the global expansion of quality totalization and 




28. organization as theory
29. diversify diversity








36. social & technical 
function virtualization
• means by which functions are done updated in 
synch with capabilities the world develops
• distributing functions to faster, newer, more 
temporary means of delivery
• quality of acquisition and use of knowledge 
measured and improved continuously
• everything set up and managed as experimental 
form not fixed right answer
• mapping of types of diversity there
• measure how well each type is seen and used
• social class fixed inventory of “managers” replaced 
as default means of delivering managing functions
• exact spec of what are functions of managing
• exact measures of when and where what amount of 
what such function is needed
• social and computer software linked as what is 
delivered
• software specified via process fault root causes not 
“wanted” functions
• all above tactics applied to other forms of quality--
quality of earth, quality of conflict, etc. 
• linear statistics technique replaced by complexity 
theory technique
• creativity dynamics studied and improved
• new commonsense ventures established
• models evolved into games into simulations into 
distributed net groupware
• social forms of virtuality as well as internet forms 
and virtual workspace forms
• computational sociality and software socialities
complexity of newly developed capabilities in the 
world input into company systems systematically as 
new substrates
reconfigurability of workforce increased so 
complexity of doer configuration matches complexity 
of form change of problems faced
scale of learning increased to match scale of 
problems faced
commitments latent in form and function shortened 
and lightened so reconfigurability (complexity) of 
doer matches complexity of problems faced
precise accounting for amounts and types and degrees 
of diversity there to be leveraged, to fully leverage 
complexity latent in own diversities
excess waste complexity of unneeded managing 
reduced and excess complexity from phenomena 
being unmanaged that need management reduced by 
precise accounting for amounts, types, and delivery 
means effectiveness for management functions
new technologies forced to contribute in entire 
existing context instead of adding to complexity by 
becoming parallel universe of “special” rules
entire tactical system reproduced to produce highly 
similar aims in very different contexts--vast 
expansion of tool set to match huge problem situation 
scope
expansion of tool set basis to match scope of 
problems faced
expansion of complexity you can invent and leverage 
to challenge complexity thrown at you by situations
entire context and framework of operation at all 
functions and levels switched radically to express 
new tool set basis above--expansion of doer 
complexity in capability to match situation 
complexity
learning aids gradually evolved into becoming major 
tools of doing actual work--reducing complexity 
introduced by spec-ing and implement-ing new 
































R. T. Greene,    Generalized Quality
80
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.32  (July  2009)
The question, arises, then, what new body of 
knowledge now has the umpf, the motive power 
behind it that quality had with Japanese competition 
as the threat behind it?   If we fi nd a body of 
knowledge amenable to the 36 globalizations above, 
but lacking an entire national economy victorious 
world wide in invading other markets as a motive 
force behind adoption of such globalizations, we can 
expect little actually to get done with it.   Without 
major motive force, the work of the above 36 
globalizations is perhaps overwhelming.   Quality 
had such a motive force behind its adoption--what 
other body of knowledge today has an equivalent 
force behind it?
The internet as a kind of mirror world that all 
existing institutions must create equivalent forms 
in comes to mind.   The US is the nation pushing 
this threat worldwide into other markets.   Software 
security is perhaps another such global movement, 
driven by the force of the internet (driven by US 
threat in turn) and driven by the threat of spam and 
net-crime.   The juncture of nanotech, bioinformatics, 
and gene technology to form some kind of highly 
automatic generator of drugs, medicines just when 
industrial nation populations are tilting toward 
being aged dominated also comes to mind.   Here 
commercial possibility, driven by real increases in 
medical demand and ability to pay, are the drivers. 
Internet touching devices will usher in a huge 
new net-sexual-contact sub-industry, driven, like 
videotape cameras by the sex drive.  Terrorism may 
drive the invention of ubiquitous camera surveillance 
and automatic person recognition systems--so that 
no place on earth is not seen, recorded, and scanned 
for suspicious activity.   Not all of these deserve 
serious consideration (net sex perhaps can be left 
unglobalized without harm).   Most, however, are real, 
important, and have enough driving force to make 
serious globalizations worth the effort perhaps.   
How the Above Result Model Handles the Sources 
of Complexity Presented Earlier in this Paper
This paper started with a model of sources 
of complexity and traditional ways of reducing 
it.   Then a model of the history of development of 
the totalization (termed here “globalizations”) of a 
body of knowledge was presented.   It was asserted 
there that that sequence of 36 types of globalization 
of the body of quality knowledge handled most of 
the sources and reducers of complexity in the fi rst 
model.   Below I support this assertion, somewhat, 
by associating with each source and reducer of 
complexity the globalization type that clearly deals 
with it.   This is not quantitative proof (getting 
such proof for just one of the 54 relationships 
shown below would entail an entire paper) but here 
presented as suggestive evidence of a qualitative sort 
(for later quantitative verifi cation where that serves 
a purpose).   Careful examination of the content of 
each globalization and the content of the complexity 
source and reducer associated with it below will 
show strong, powerful, evident relevance between 
associated items, not vague, casual, sloppy, or 
inconsequential relations.
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Which Globalizations of Any Body of Knowledge Reduce Which Complexity Sources
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The Call to Adventure as Finding and 
Extending Complexity
People and groups do not just suffer from 
complexity and reduce it, they also actively like and 
seek certain forms of it.   The call to adventure in 
personal lives, literature, and careers is often a call 
from less complexity, risk, and discomfort, to more. 
People like to live on edge, at least a signifi cant 
number of them do.   It is through side-effects of 
these adventurers and their adventures that many of 
humanity’s most important capabilities and inventions 
have arisen.  Exploring complexity’s most dense, 
concentrated, and dangerous locales appeals to some 
people and defi nes many forms of adventure.   This 
area is treated in other work I have done on models 
of creativity, each model being a representation of 
one type of complexity that people choose to explore 
and challenge.   I refer readers to that work rather 
than summarizing it here (Greene, 2003).  
Conclusion
This research presented three models.  One is a 
model of sources and reducers of complexity. Two 
is a model of 36 totalizations (called globalizations 
here) applied to one body of knowledge--quality 
knowledge--in the total quality movement’s 30 year 
worldwide history.   A version of this model with all 
quality references factored out is provided.  Three 
is a model showing how each source and reducer 
of complexity is handled by one or more of the 
globalization types in that abstracted model.  After 
that, other bodies of knowledge, the complexities 
of which might also be well handled by the same 
sequence of 36 types of globalization, are then 
suggested, based on what other bodies of knowledge 
have suffi cient motive force to justify the extremes 
of effort, persistence, and complexity required 
to perform the 36 globalization types.  Nothing 
is proved in this research, rather a huge scope 
of material is organized and framed to make a 
hypothesis, qualitatively supported with evidence that 
is only suggestive in this paper.  My goal is to turn 
the entire history of evolution of quality totalization 
(“globalizations of one distinct body of knowledge”) 
into a quite general tool that we can apply to other 
bodies of knowledge.  This not only enlightens our 
view of what the total quality movement means 
and might mean, but it also greatly extends the 
scope of its possible application and importance 
in the future.   Of course, I fully realize how much 
this kind of paper differs from the tightly focussed 
statistical testing of a few causal paths among six 
or eight variables found in most journal papers.   I 
also realize, however, that publishing just more such 
narrowly focussed studies, eventually reduces interest 
and readership of journals.  This paper, on the 
contrary, is a kind of large scale theorizing that helps 
frame dozens of research questions and generate 
dozens more.   Seeing how the sequence of expansion 
of quality knowledge handling, found in the total 
quality movement, handles each of many sources 
and types of complexity, changes our understanding 
of why and how such movements evolve and what 
drives that evolution.  It frames further exploration of 
such questions.
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